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Steven Menashi*
This Article challenges the scholarly consensus that a textualist reading of
the Constitution cannot support a broad constitutional principle of state sover-
eign immunity. In doing so, it develops a fuller account of textualist constitu-
tional interpretation, recognizing that the original public meaning of a text
may be informed by commonly held philosophical presuppositions or back-
ground political principles. Legislative compromise, moreover, pervaded the
whole constitutional design, whether it took the form of precisely worded provi-
sions that enact particular policies or imprecisely worded provisions that invoke
abstract political principles.
The ratification of Article III contained just such a legislative compromise
over abstract principles of state sovereign immunity. A potentially ratification-
blocking minority of Antifederalists opposed granting ftderal courts jurisdiction
over suits by individuals against states. In order to win ratification of the
Constitution, Federalists gave to Article III a construction that incorporates a
background principle of state sovereign immunity. That construction formed
the original public understanding of Article III and the compromise struck at
ratification. A textualist approach should honor that compromise. The ratifi-
cation process gave political minorities the right to insist on such a compromise,
so it would violate the process values underlying the Constitution to conclude,
as most scholars do, that Federalist assurances respecting state sovereign immu-
nity formed no part of the constitutional bargain.
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While many scholars have long criticized the Supreme Court's state sover-
eign immunity jurisprudence as inconsistent with other constitutional values,
modern textualism and public choice theory recognize the centrality of compro-
mise in the lawmaking process. The Constitution, too, was the product of a
ratiflcation process that involved political compromises. This insight, however,
has been applied to constitutional interpretation in only a limited way. The
few scholars who have applied the insights of public choice theory to constitu-
tional interpretation have argued that a textualist approach to state sovereign
immunity would read the Eleventh Amendment narrowly in order to respect a
possible legislative compromise embedded in its precise text. But the limited
textualism of scholars such as John Manning and Lawrence Marshall leads to
a strained and implausible reading of the Eleventh Amendment because it fails
to recognize the original understanding of the initial bargain embedded in Arti-
cle IN.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the divergent and conflicting theories of state sovereign
immunity, it's no surprise to hear that "the Eleventh Amendment is a
mess" that is "inconsistently conceptualized."' Yet it still raises eye-
brows when the doctrine prompts a battle cry from the professoriate.
"The Court's Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity case law
deserves the condemnation and resistance of scholars,"2 declared
1 John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REv. 47, 47 (1998) (footnote omitted).
2 Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Elev-
enth Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 953 (2000);
see alsoJames E. Pfander, Once More unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship and
the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 819 (2000) (noting extensive scholarly criticism
of the Court and expressing hope "that responsible professional comment and criti-
cism may yet ... restrain judicial arbitrariness at the highest level").
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Vicki Jackson in the wake of the Supreme Court's triple volley of F/or-
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank,3 College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,4 and Alden v. Maine.5 Bellicose pedagogues took to the
barricades, pronouncing sovereign immunity "an anachronistic
relic . . . [that] should be eliminated from American law"6 and con-
signing the Court to the wrong side of history for failing to recognize
it as such.
7
In fact, the conflict over sovereign immunity has been a long-
standing and persistent feature of academic and judicial debate. "It is
no wonder the Court's Eleventh Amendment case law is incoherent;
in law, as in logic, anything can be derived from a contradiction,"
Akhil Amar wrote two decades ago.8 Since then, opponents of the
Court's broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity have
managed to hold on to four votes,9 with some pushback from the
Court's majority.' 0 Thus, while some legal scholars readied their guns
3 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (invalidating Congress' abrogation of state sover-
eign immunity from suit under a provision of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act).
4 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (invalidating Congress' abrogation of state sovereign
immunity from suit under a provision of the Lanham Act).
5 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity protects states
from suit by private persons in the states' own courts on federal causes of action).
6 Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1201-03
(2001) ("The [sovereign immunity] doctrine conflicts with too many basic constitu-
tional principles to survive.").
7 Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1067 (2000) ("[T]he Court's attempt to cling to concep-
tions of state sovereign immunity is not stable [and] history casts serious doubt on the
capacity of the Court to stand against the current of the national political process in
any sustained way."). But see id. ("Such a prediction ... is more likely eventually to be
proven correct if repeated with sufficient frequency.").
8 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1480 (1987).
9 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Welch v. Tex.
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.).
10 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68 (majority opinion) ("The dissent, to the
contrary, disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review
articles and its own version of historical events."); Welch, 483 U.S. at 478-79 (majority
opinion) ("Today, for the fourth time in little more than two years, four Members of
the Court urge that we overrule Hans v. Louisiana and the long line of cases that has
followed it. The rule of law depends in large part on adherence to the doctrine of
stare decisis.... Despite these time-honored principles, the dissenters-on the basis of
ambiguous historical evidence-would flatly overrule a number of major decisions of
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for combat, others-predicting ceaseless war and heavy casualties-
raised the white flag in hope of ending the stalemate.11
One source of the controversy is the desire for conceptual coher-
ence in the Constitution. "[T]he American doctrine of sovereign
immunity is indefensible upon both theoretical and pragmatic
grounds," writes Clyde Jacobs, calling it "an unfortunate excrescence
of a political and legal order which no longer enlists support."'12
"[S]overeign immunity is in conflict with other fundamental princi-
ples of the U.S. constitutional system including the rule of law and the
supremacy of federal law," asserts Jackson. 13 "Sovereign immunity is
inconsistent with a central maxim of American government: no one,
not even the government, is above the law," argues Erwin Chemerin-
sky. 14 "Is the Constitution therefore divided against itself?." asks
Amar.
1 5
Well, yes it is, to some extent. As James Madison observed, the
convention that drafted the Constitution-to say nothing of the state
ratifying conventions that adopted it-was marked by disagreement,
especially with respect to the interests of states. "We may well suppose
that neither side would entirely yield to the other, and consequently
that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise," he
wrote.' 6 "[T]he convention must have been compelled to sacrifice
theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations.' 17
There is no reason to believe that the Constitution does not contain
inconsistencies when judged against broad theoretical goals.' 8
the Court, and cast doubt on others. Once again, the dissenters have placed in issue
the fundamental nature of our federal system." (footnote and citations omitted)).
11 See Andrew B. Coan, Text as Truce: A Peace Proposal for the Supreme Court's Costly
War over the Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511, 2518 (2006) ("The bottom
line is this: The history of the Eleventh Amendment is fundamentally inconclusive.").
12 CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 160
(1972); cf. David E. Engdahl, Book Review, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 256, 259 (1974)
(reviewing JACOBS, supra) ("[A] somewhat more penetrating study would have
demonstrated that the contemporary doctrine is indefensible also upon historical and
legal grounds.").
13 Jackson, supra note 2, at 956.
14 Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 1202.
15 Amar, supra note 8, at 1426 (asking also, "[i]s the way in which it constitutes
political bodies at war with the legal rights that it constitutionalizes?").
16 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229-30 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
17 Id. at 230.
18 See id. ("Would it be wonderful if, under the pressure of all these difficulties,
the convention should have been forced into some deviations from that artificial
structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the subject might lead an
ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or in his imagina-
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Madison even singled out "the trial of controversies to which States
may be parties" as an instance of inconsistency in the broader consti-
tutional design. 19
Like Madison, modern textualists and public choice theorists
realize the difficulty of ascribing theoretical coherence to multimem-
ber assemblies, where the necessity of bargaining and compromise, as
well as the constraints of the legislative process, often define the out-
come. 20 To the extent that scholars have applied the insights of pub-
lic choice theory to constitutional interpretation, they have concluded
that courts should read precisely worded constitutional texts narrowly
in order to avoid disturbing a possible legislative compromise that,
whether recorded or not, may have been essential to its enactment.
21
" [W] hen interpreting a precisely worded constitutional provision like
the Eleventh Amendment, the Court must adhere to the compromise
embedded in the text," writes John Manning.2 2 For that reason, these
tion?"); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 16, at 246 (noting
that the proposed Constitution "is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Con-
stitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in
the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly
federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not fed-
eral; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally in the authori-
tative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly
national").
19 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 16, at 245 ("On trying the
Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the national not the federal character;
though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and par-
ticularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be
viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far
the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a
few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan .....
20 See infra Part I.B.
21 SeeJohn F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitu-
tional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1735-36, 1749-50 (2004); see also Randy E. Barnett,
The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv.
1729, 1747 (2007) ("To interpret the Amendment more broadly than the language
that was actually proposed and ratified is to run a serious risk of overriding the desires
of either a majority or a potential ratification-blocking minority who would never have
consented to a broader claim of state power.");Jackson, supra note 2, at 1000 (argu-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment should be treated as a "compromise or concession"
rather than a "principle" because "[t] he precision and specificity of its language lend
themselves to (though they do not compel) a narrow reading"); Lawrence C. Mar-
shall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1342, 1353-56
(1989) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment reads as if it "embod[ies] a balance
between the competing values of state immunity from federal suit and accountability
to the new federal system").
22 Manning, supra note 21, at 1750.
20091 1139
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
textualists argue, the Court should limit state immunity from suit to
the precise text of the Eleventh Amendment.
23
This Article argues for a textualist approach to the Constitution,
and to state sovereign immunity in particular, that does not privilege
precisely worded texts over other constitutional provisions. As
Madison suggests, compromise pervaded the whole constitutional
design, whether it took the form of precisely worded provisions that
enact particular policies or broadly worded provisions that invoke
abstract political principles. Textualists are right to respect the politi-
cal compromise on which the authority of the Constitution rests, but
singling out some sections of the Constitution for special interpretive
techniques may distort rather than honor that compromise. A pre-
cisely worded text such as the Eleventh Amendment may contain a
political compromise, but so may an imprecisely worded text such as
Article III. Reading the former textually and the latter purposively
gives force to some compromises and obliterates others. Disagree-
ment, and constitutional compromise, may occur over abstract princi-
ples such as sovereignty and justiciability as well as over particular
policies and rules. A sounder textualist approach would respect all
political compromises behind the Constitution's provisions. The orig-
inal understanding of a constitutional doctrine such as state sovereign
immunity may have depended on both.
Part I sketches the debate over state sovereign immunity and the
relevant insights of modern textualism and public choice theory. Part
II provides an account of Article III, an imprecisely worded constitu-
tional text, as a legislative compromise. Part III explains how the fail-
ure to respect the compromise behind an imprecisely worded
23 Even among those who accept this principle, however, there is no agreement
on what the precise text of the Eleventh Amendment means. See Manning, supra note
21, at 1680-81 n.68 (noting that both the diversity theory and the literal theory
"represent a plausible reading of the Amendment's text"); Jackson, supra note 2, at
1000 n.151 ("Although diversity theorists differ from Marshall on whether the
Amendment bars out-of-state citizens from suing a state in federal court under the
'federal question'jurisdiction, both theories read the Amendment (far more narrowly
than does the Court) not to bar suits by in-staters or by foreign states."); Marshall,
supra note 21, at 1347-48 (arguing that diversity and congressional abrogation theo-
ries "completely... ignore the operative words of the amendment"); see also William
A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1261, 1276-78 (1989) ("The problem is that the text does not clearly
mean what Professors Marshall and Massey think it does."); Calvin R. Massey, State
Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 61, 115 (1989)
("[T] hose who construe the amendment as only a narrow limitation upon Article III's
diversity jurisdiction are required to amend its text in order to deliver their desired
meaning.").
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provision such as Article III produces a strained and implausible read-
ing of a precisely worded text such as the Eleventh Amendment.
Together, these Parts show that a compromise over state sovereign
immunity shaped the public understanding of Article III, and that the
Eleventh Amendment, in turn, depended on that understanding.
Contrary to the scholarly consensus, then, a textualist approach to
constitutional interpretation supports the Court's finding a principle
of sovereign immunity rooted in Article III.
I. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND MODERN TEXTUALISM
Ambiguities in the text and history of Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment have yielded an array of competing theories over the sta-
tus and scope of state sovereign immunity under the Constitution.
Modern textualism, drawing on insights from public choice theory,
provides a method for understanding and resolving such ambiguities.
A. Reading Article III and the Eleventh Amendment
"When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in
their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered
dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is commu-
nicated," wrote James Madison of the problem of interpretation.
24
Uncertain meaning, he explained, proceeds not only from the inade-
quacies of language, but also from the imperfection of human facul-
ties and the indistinctness of novel or complex ideas (such as a written
constitution or a federal government). "Any one of these must pro-
duce a certain degree of obscurity. The convention, in delineating
the boundary between the federal and State jurisdictions, must have
experienced the full effect of them all."
'25
So, evidently, it did-and nowhere more acutely than in the area
of state sovereign immunity. Article III of the Constitution extended
the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases involving the states as
parties:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;- between a State and Citi-
zens of another State,-between Citizens of different States;-between
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Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
26
The text alone did not specify whether states could be impleaded
as defendants, 27 and the possibility of states' susceptibility to suit pro-
voked some controversy in the ratification debates. 2 Despite the
assurances of Madison and other supporters of the Constitution that
the states' sovereign immunity would survive ratification, 29 the
Supreme Court quickly concluded that it did not.30 An alarmed pub-
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
27 See infra Part IIB; see alsoJACOBS, supra note 12, at 21 ("Textual analysis of
various provisions of Article III, then, suggests contradictory answers as to whether the
states were to retain immunity from suit by individuals; that is, the language of that
provision, by itself, yields no answer.").
28 See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 527 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila.,J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d
ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of George Mason) ("Is this state
to be brought to the bar ofjustice like a delinquent individual? Is the sovereignty of
the state to be arraigned like a culprit, or private offender? Will the states undergo
this mortification?"); see also Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sover-
eign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 527-36 (1978) (examining
the debates over the status of sovereign immunity when the Constitution was ratified);
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Con-
struction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1045-54 (1983) (detailing the ratification debates, including
alternative proposals for the state-citizen diversity clause of Article III); Alfred Hill, In
Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 494 (2001) ("The debate
among the leading statesmen of the time centered almost exclusively on whether the
states, without their consent, were suable in the federal courts, in light of the provi-
sion in Article III extending the federal judicial power to controversies 'between a
State and Citizens. of another State . . . and between a State ... and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects."' (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
1)).
29 See infra Part II.C; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716 (1999) ("The
leading advocates of the Constitution assured the people in no uncertain terms that
the Constitution would not strip the States of sovereign immunity."); Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70-71 & n.13 (1996) ("[W]hat is notably lacking in the Fram-
ers' statements is any mention of Congress' power to abrogate the States' immu-
nity."); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1934) (explaining
Madison's view that the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was "to provide for adju-
dication in such cases if consent should be given but not otherwise"); Hans v. Louisi-
ana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1890) (offering statements from Hamilton and Madison).
30 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 452 (1793) (opinion of Blair, J.)
("[W]hen a State, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the
judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of sover-
eignty."); id. at 476 (opinion ofJay, C.J.) ("If the Constitution really meant to extend
these powers only to those controversies in which a State might be Plaintiff to the
exclusion of those in which citizens had demands against a State, it is inconceivable
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lic repudiated the Court's decision by calling for a constitutional
amendment, 31 but the Eleventh Amendment's text left the scope of
that rejection unclear.32 Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment has
been read variously to contain a range of meanings. The prevailing
judicial interpretation, the "immunity theory," takes the Amendment
to restore the background principle of state sovereign immunity that
existed in the Constitution prior to Chisholm v. Georgia 33-namely,
that a state is not amenable to suits by individuals without its con-
sent.34 A second reading, the 'jurisdiction theory," recognizes such a
traditional principle but argues that the Eleventh Amendment
introduces a new restriction on federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Thus, while traditional state sovereign immunity is waivable by states
(and perhaps modifiable by Congress), Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity is not.35 A third reading, the "congressional abrogation theory,"
that it should have attempted to convey that meaning in words, not only so incompe-
tent, but also repugnant to it .... ).
31 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11 (noting that Chisholm "created such a shock of surprise
throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due
course adopted by the legislatures of the states").
32 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."); see also Gordon C. Post, Book Review, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci., Sept. 1973, at 206, 206 ("The Constitution being a document of many ambigui-
ties-a source of its strength-one ambiguity was replaced with another.").
33 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
34 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (recognizing a "background principle of state
sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment"); see also Blatchford v.
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("Despite the narrowness of its terms,
since Hans v. Louisiana, we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which
it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact;
that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a State
will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to
suit . . . ." (citations omitted)); Hill, supra note 28, at 489-90 ("[T]he Eleventh
Amendment, in the cases to which it applies, is merely an embodiment of the original
understanding underlying the Constitution . . . ."); cf. Alden, 527 U.S. at 728 ("These
holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding, consistent with the views of the
leading advocates of the Constitution's ratification, that sovereign immunity derives
not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitu-
tion itself." (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997))).
35 Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 -ARv.
L. REV. 1559, 1566 (2002) ("When given its most natural reading, the Eleventh
Amendment creates a second type of sovereign immunity, which sounds in subject
matter jurisdiction and which therefore cannot be waived."); see also KARL SINGEWALD,
THE DOCTRINE OF NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (1910) ("The
2009] 1143
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reads the Amendment to reinstate an extraconstitutional common law
doctrine of state sovereign immunity that restrains courts but which
Congress may override.3 6 A fourth reading, the "diversity theory,"
holds the Amendment only to repeal federal diversity jurisdiction over
suits against states while leaving states subject to suit under federal
question and admiralty jurisdiction.3 7 A fifth reading, the "literalist"
effect [of the Eleventh Amendment] was just as if the judicial power had never been
extended to such cases. It would seem clear, therefore, that consent of the States
cannot confer jurisdiction."); William D. Guthrie, The Eleventh Article of Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 183, 188 (1908) ("[I]t is difficult to
perceive how the consent or waiver of a State can, in any case and under any circum-
stances, confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction of a suit against it by a citizen of
another State or a citizen or subject of a foreign State in the face of the imperative
mandate of the amendment .... "); cf. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 321 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("I had always supposed that jurisdictional power to entertain a suit was
not capable of waiver and could not be conferred by consent,").
36 United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1354 (3d Cir. 1987), affd sub
nom. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) ("The eleventh amendment
reflects our system of checks and balances by limiting the power to abrogate sovereign
immunity to the freely elected legislative branch."); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 228 n.89 (1980) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment was intended merely to
make clear that Article III did not by itself grant federal courts jurisdiction in cases
where states were defendants, not to bar Congress from creating such jurisdiction.");
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congres-
sional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203, 1279 (1978) ("Histori-
cal materials suggest that the correct interpretation is that the established doctrine of
sovereign immunity survived the adoption of the Constitution and of the eleventh
amendment, but that the doctrine is not constitutionally required."); see alsoJohn E.
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Govern-
ments and the Histoy of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413,
1422-30 (1975) (arguing that the history of Article III and the Eleventh Amendment
reveals the Federalists' belief that Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity); Lau-
rence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Sep-
aration of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 682, 693-99
(1976) (arguing that the congressional abrogation theory is "[t] he only satisfying rec-
onciliation of the [Supreme Court] cases").
37 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 110 (Souter, J., dissenting); Welch v. Tex. Dep't
of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 497 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting); Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("There simply is no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, and no con-
stitutionally mandated policy of excluding suits against States from federal court.");
Amar, supra note 8, at 1475 ("The party alignments specified by the Eleventh Amend-
ment would no longer provide an independent basis for jurisdiction (as they had in
Chisholm), but the existence of such an alignment would not oustjurisdiction that was
independently grounded-for example, in federal question or admiralty cases.");
Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1130; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004 (1983); Vicki C.
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or "textualist theory," reads the Amendment according to its precise
terms to preclude all suits against a state by citizens of a foreign state
or aliens-irrespective of the asserted grounds for jurisdiction-while
implicitly authorizing jurisdiction over suits of any other party align-
ment possible under the literal terms of Article 111.38
B. Modern Textualism
The literalist or textualist contribution to the Eleventh Amend-
ment debate is important because it-perhaps for the first time3 9-
begins the discussion of the Amendment's meaning with its text,
divorced from the presumption that all elements of the Constitution
must logically cohere. "The fallacy of the current eleventh amend-
ment theories lies in their relentless demand for a single theoretical
principle that can coherently explain the amendment, and even bet-
ter, also explain how the amendment is consistent with the principles
Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J. 1, 44-51 (1988).
38 See Barnett, supra note 21, at 1743; Manning, supra note 21, at 1680 n.68; Mar-
shall, supra note 21, at 1346-47 & n.14. As noted, supra note 23, Manning explicitly
reserves judgment as to whether the literalist or diversity reading is best-but his tex-
tualist methodology justifies his inclusion here. These authors might also appropri-
ately be grouped with those in note 35, supra, since their textualist approach would
presumably lead them to conclude that the Eleventh Amendment represents a
mandatory limit on subject matterjurisdiction. Yet while Manning and Marshall con-
sider the possibility that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not waivable, neither
endorses the idea. See Manning, supra note 21, at 1745 n.314; Marshall, supra note 21,
at 1348 n.26. More importantly, these authors ascribe to the Eleventh Amendment a
negative implication, such that it exhaustively specifies the available classes of state
sovereign immunity in federal court and displaces any residual authority to develop
further jurisdictional sovereign immunity principles. See Barnett, supra note 21, at
1746; Manning, supra note 21, at 1723-24; Marshall, supra note 21, at 1347. This
distinguishes their views from those of Nelson and Singewald, who argue that the
Eleventh Amendment's nonwaivable immunity added to-but did not displace-an
already extant waivable immunity acknowledged in Article III and incorrectly ignored
by the Chisholm Court. See Nelson, supra note 34, at 1580-92. For Manning, Barnett,
and Marshall, the Amendment represents a political decision on the extent to which
states should be protected from suit, made against the legal baseline of Chisholm. See
also Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 61, 65-67 (1989) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment represents an
"'unflinchingly political"' decision "to create a party based denial ofjurisdiction to the
federal courts that sweeps across all the jurisdictional heads of Article III" and not a
"broad grant of immunity" (quoting Gibbons, supra note 37, at 2003)).
39 See Coan, supra note 11, at 2511 ("Courts and commentators have debated the
original meaning of the Eleventh Amendment for more than 100 years. This debate
has a peculiar characteristic, however. It has paid remarkably little attention to the
text of the Eleventh Amendment.").
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that gave rise to the Constitution," writes Lawrence Marshall. "This
may be a fascinating exercise, but it surely fails to reflect the realities
of the political process.
40
The literalist reading thus builds on the insights of modern textu-
alism and public choice theory.4 1  In contrast to interpretive
approaches that focus on legislative purpose, "modern textualism sug-
gests that the complexities of the legislative process make it meaning-
less to speak of a legislative 'intent' at odds with the intent expressed
by the clear social meaning of the enacted text."42 This insight rests
on two empirical propositions. First, legislators' preferences fre-
quently cannot be aggregated into a coherent collective preference.
43
A multimember body may have intransitive preferences, which could
lead to endless cycling without some mechanism for forcing a final
vote. Legislative outcomes therefore turn on the particulars of the
legislative process, especially the order in which proposals are consid-
ered.44 In fact, whoever controls the legislative agenda can manipu-
late the process so that the legislature will adopt a proposal that only a
40 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1353.
41 SeeJohn F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2388, 2408-19
(2003) (discussing the intersection of modern textualism and public choice theory);
see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FicKEv, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 88-115 (1991)
(examining possible applications of public choice theory to problems of statutory
interpretation); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533,
544-47 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains] (same); Frank H. Easter-
brook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. RE-V. 4, 15 (1984) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, Economic System] (same); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV.
275, 276-77 (1988) (same); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 621, 641-44 (1990) (same).
42 Manning, supra note 41, at 2408; see also Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra
note 41, at 547 ("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have
'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a
design. The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes.").
43 See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-8 (2d
ed. 1963) (introducing his theorem on "passing from a set of known individual tastes
to a pattern of social decision-making"); WILLIAM N. Esi.RDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION 34-38 (1994) ("[E]ven text-based interpretation is hard to link
up with majority preferences because there may be several equally plausible majority-
based preferences in the legislature."); FARBER & FRiCKEY, supra note 41, at 38-42
(discussing Arrow's Theorem); AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WEL-
FARE 161-72 (1970) (discussing the problem of cyclical majorities).
44 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123, 126-27 (1989) ("[Arrovian public choice] suggests that the
outcomes of collective decisions are probably meaningless because it is impossible to
be certain that they are not simply an artifact of the decision process that has been
used.").
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minority supports.45 Legislators may counteract the effects of agenda
manipulation through strategic voting and logrolling, in which case
votes for or against a measure will not necessarily reflect support or
opposition to it.46 One struggles mightily, then, to ascribe "purpose"
to a law when its content reflects the incidental effect of strategic
behavior and procedural rules.
Second, and most important here, legislation that emerges from
a multimember assembly is typically the result of bargaining and com-
promise. Legislators themselves possess different goals, interests, and
ideologies. Legislation often reflects not simply their own com-
promises, but bargaining among interest groups. 47 Laws that emerge
from a process of compromise "may be awkward precisely because
they attempt to split the difference between competing principles."
48
Textualists, however, respect the awkward lines in order to honor the
underlying compromise:
While textualists acknowledge that legislation may appear over- or
underinclusive in relation to its background purpose, they also
emphasize that a seeming lack of fit may reflect the fruits of an
unrecorded legislative compromise or the byproduct of compli-
cated legislative bargaining, rather than a reflection of imprecisely
expressed legislative intent.
49
"Many laws are compromises," according to Judge Easterbrook,
"going thus far and no further in pursuit of a goal. ' 50 It would upset
the legislative balance to push the deal in either direction: "When a
court observes that Congress propelled Group X part way to its
desired end, it cannot assist Group X farther along the journey with-
out undoing the structure of the deal." 5 1 Thus, when a judge is
asked to extend the scope of a back-room deal, he refuses unless the
proof of the deal's scope is compelling. Omissions are evidence
45 Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, supra note 41, at 547; see also Michael E. Levine
& Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REv. 561, 561 (1977)
(" [T] here probably is no single nondictatorial method of aggregating the preferences
of an electorate that will reliably produce a choice which satisfies minimal consistency
and rationality standards.").
46 Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, supra note 41, at 548 ("[W]hen logrolling is at
work the legislative process is submerged and courts lose the information they need
to divine the body's design.").
47 Easterbrook, Economic System, supra note 41, at 15 ("One of the implications of
modem economic thought is that many laws are designed to serve private rather than
public interests.").
48 Manning, supra note 41, at 2411.
49 Manning, supra note 21, at 1689-90.
50 Hrubec v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995).
51 Easterbrook, Economic System, supra note 41, at 46.
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that no bargain was struck: some issues were left for the future, or
perhaps one party was unwilling to pay the price of a resolution in
its favor. Sometimes the compromise may be to toss an issue to the
courts for resolution, but this too is a term of the bargain, to be
demonstrated rather than presumed. What the parties did not
resolve, the court should not resolve either. 52
Respecting the bounds of legislative compromise accords not
only with the judiciary's role as faithful agent of the legislature, but
also with the structural features of the Constitution. The require-
ments of bicameralism and presentment 53 aim to counteract the influ-
ence of faction by dividing legislative power among three institutions
that represent different constituencies. 54 This structure demands com-
promise among competing factions precisely to prevent any particular
"Group X" in Easterbrook's terms, from getting everything it wants.
It protects political minorities by assigning them the power to block
legislation and therefore the ability to demand compromise as the
price of their assent. If a partial victory in the legislature could be
completed in the courts, this constitutional protection would disap-
pear and the distinctive features of Article I, Section 7 would lose their
significance.
Given that a statute may contain an indeterminate purpose or a
compromise, textualism adheres to the original public meaning of the
text. This inquiry is not limited to the four corners of the document,
however:
[I] t is now well settled that textual interpretation must account for
the text in its social and linguistic context. Even the strictest mod-
ern textualists properly emphasize that language is a social con-
struct. They ask how a reasonable person, conversant with the
relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in
context. This approach recognizes that the literal or dictionary def-
initions of words will often fail to account for settled nuances or
background conventions that qualify the literal meaning of lan-
guage and, in particular, of legal language.
55
52 Id. at 15.
53 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
54 Manning, supra note 41, at 2437.
55 Id. at 2392-93; see also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MAT-
TER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 23-24 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("Textualism should not
be confused with so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that
brings the whole philosophy into disrepute .... A text should not be construed
strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to
contain all that it fairly means .... [T]he good textualist is not a literalist . . ").
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Textualism accepts the proposition that "language is intelligible
by virtue of a community's shared conventions for understanding
words in context," so that one judge's "particular interpretations of
words in context [are] correct or incorrect as measured by the rele-
vant interpretive community's practices" and assumptions. 56 Thus,
the Bolognian criminal statute "that whoever drew blood in the streets
should be punished with the utmost severity" would not reach the sur-
geon who performed an emergency operation on someone who col-
lapsed in the street.57 While the phrase "draw blood" might describe
the doctor's activity when employed in some contexts, in the criminal
code the phrase denotes a violent piercing of the skin. 58 Being a textu-
alist does not require one to be obtuse.59 Similarly, "background legal
conventions ,' 60 or "those assumptions that a reasonable member of
the legal subcommunity would bring to a statute in context,"6' may
also define the original public meaning. "[M]odern textualists
unflinchingly rely on legal conventions that instruct courts, in recur-
rent circumstances, to supplement the bare text with established qual-
ifications designed to advance certain substantive policies," says
Manning. "For example, in the absence of clear congressional direc-
tion to the contrary, textualists read mens rea requirements into oth-
erwise unqualified criminal statutes because established judicial
56 Manning, supra note 41, at 2396-97; see alsoJEREMY WALDRON, LAw AND DISA-
GREEMENT 129 (1999) (arguing that legislatures approve statutory language on the
assumption that "members of [the] community commonly use such words to produce
a certain effect or response in their audience").
57 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1869); see also Manning,
supra note 41, at 2461-62 ("[U]nder a modern understanding of textual interpreta-
tion, dismissing the charges against [a] surgeon [in this situation] would comport
with the ordinary meaning of the statute in context.").
58 Manning, supra note 41, at 2461-62 (noting that "a modern textualist ...
would place different glosses on the phrase 'drew blood' in different contexts"); see
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994) ("Words take their meaning from contexts, of
which there are many-other words, social and linguistic conventions, the problems
the authors were addressing. Texts appeal to communities of listeners, and we use
them purposively. The purposes, and so the meaning, will change with context, and
over time.").
59 See Manning, supra note 41, at 2398 (" [T]he Court's plain meaning presump-
tion is best understood as an evidentiary rule of thumb. Specifically, if a statutory text
is clear by virtue of a perceived social consensus about the meaning of its words in
context, that conventional meaning may supply the most reliable evidence of what a
multimember legislative body collectively 'intended."').
60 Id. at 2465.
61 Id. at 2470; see also WALDRON, supra note 56, at 129 n.33 ("Legislation may also
rely on certain quasi-linguistic conventions common to legislative draftsmen and the
legal/judicial community.").
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practice calls for interpreting such statutes in light of common law
mental state requirements." 62 Similarly, "a criminal statute's meaning
is properly qualified by the background defense of necessity" or a fed-
eral statute of limitations may be read implicitly to incorporate the
doctrine of equitable tolling.63 Likewise, remedies for constitutional
violations under § 1983 are implicitly limited by absolute or qualified
immunity.64 Or a grant ofjudicial power, as explored in the next Part,
may be limited by sovereign immunity.
II. ARTICLE III AS A LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISE
The Constitution does not rest on a unitary theory, but represents
a series of political compromises over fundamental principles as well
as particular policies. State sovereign immunity was among those
principles debated during ratification. The plain text of Article III
does not resolve the question of state sovereign immunity under the
Constitution, but Chisholm illustrates competing approaches. The
majority position in Chisholm relied on theories about the status of
sovereignty under the Constitution to conclude that Article III had
eliminated state sovereign immunity. Justice Iredell's dissenting
view-that a reasonable observer would expect an explicit provision if
such a major change in federal power was intended-follows from
fidelity to constitutional text. Behind the ambiguity of Article III lies a
compromise struck at ratification. A potentially ratification-blocking
minority of Antifederalists opposed granting federal courts jurisdic-
tion over suits by individuals against states. In order to win ratification
of the Constitution, Federalists gave to Article III a construction that
incorporates a background principle of state sovereign immunity.
That construction formed the original public understanding of Article
III.
62 Manning, supra note 41, at 2465-66; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 605 (1994) ("[W]e must construe the statute in light of the background rules of
the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly
embedded." (citation omitted)).
63 Manning, supra note 41, at 2471; see also Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrig-
ley, Jr. Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992) ("[T]he venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex
('the law cares not for trifles') is part of the established background of legal principles
against which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary
indication) are deemed to accept.").
64 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-07 (1982).
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A. The Constitution as a Product of Compromise
Traditionally, even among those who insist on a textualist
approach to statutes, constitutional interpretation has been distin-
guished as requiring greater flexibility.6 5 The greater difficulty of
altering the Constitution legislatively, the evolving needs of society,
and the enthusiastic invocation of Justice Marshall's shopworn catch-
phrase ("[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding"66 ) have been taken to justify more purposive, atextual
interpretation in the constitutional realm. But constitutional texts
may involve even greater compromise than ordinary statutes. The
constitutional amendment process of Article V, for example, requires
supermajorities of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-
fourths of the states6 7-establishing even greater safeguards for politi-
cal minorities than the legislative process of bicameralism and pre-
sentment in Article J.68 Article V was understood at the time of
ratification to protect the states-especially the smaller states-from
easy changes in the terms of the union. States submitted to the consti-
tutional plan "only on the premise that Article V's requirements
would make it very difficult to change the terms according to which
the states came together."69 Thus, one-fourth of the states are given
the power to block constitutional change 7 0-or, correspondingly, to
exact compromise as the price of their assent. Article V grants the
same power to political minorities in the national constituency as
65 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 282 (1982) ("[V]irtually everyone who writes on
the question thinks that constitutional provisions should not be construed as strictly
as statutory provisions."). But see Scalia, supra note 55, at 37 (noting that constitu-
tional interpretation is distinctive "not because special principles of interpretation
apply, but because the usual principles are being applied to an unusual text").
66 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis
added).
67 U.S. CONST. art. V.
68 Manning, supra note 21, at 1718.
69 Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitu-
tional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 129-30 (1996) ("Article V was a vital part of
a larger design that ensured that, in the new constitutional order, the individual states
would remain independent and important political communities, and that the terms
of their union with one another could be altered only if substantial obstacles were
overcome.").
70 See id. at 156 (noting Patrick Henry's observation that "a 'bare majority' in
'four small States' containing 'one-twentieth part of the American people'" might
prevent constitutional amendment (quoting Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia
Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 943, 956 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saldino eds., 1984))).
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well-that is, those represented by one-third of either the House or
Senate.
71
Manning observes that "similar but not identical process consid-
erations also apply to original provisions of the Constitution, whose
methods of proposal and ratification also assigned disproportionate
weight to political minorities-particularly the residents of small
states.'72 Equal representation of states at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion "self-evidently gave small states' residents a disproportionate voice
in shaping the Convention's political compromises" and "it almost
surely accounts for some of the Constitution's most important fea-
tures," he explains. "[0] ne might safely conclude that the process for
adopting the original Constitution, although rather improvised, also
assigned political minorities (mainly small states' residents) a dispro-
portionate right to insist on compromise. '7 3 Ratification of the Con-
stitution ultimately required a supermajority of two-thirds of the
states.74  Manning's argument about reading constitutional texts
applies equally to the Constitution's original provisions as to amend-
ments.7 5 In fact, he acknowledges that compromise marks the adop-
tion of all constitutional texts, whether about particular policies or
broad principles.
7 6
Lawrence Marshall invokes even more explicitly political compro-
mise as the key to understanding any constitutional provision:
If the history of the Constitution (not to mention modern legisla-
tion) tells us anything, it tells a story of constant political compro-
mise between dramatically opposed ideological, economic, and
regional factions. To understand the "intent" or "purpose" behind
any piece of legislation, including a constitutional provision or
amendment, it is necessary first to understand the goals and powers
of the various factions that competed to have their views enacted
into law. It is then important to consider whether any one faction
prevailed on the measure, or whether the provision represents a
71 Manning, supra note 21, at 1719.
72 Id. at 1701-02.
73 Id. at 1702 n.143.
74 See U.S. Const. art. VII.
75 Manning, supra note 21, at 1702 ("Given the relevant similarity between Arti-
cles V and VII, I rely below on both the original provisions of the Constitution and its
amendments to illustrate the role of compromise in reading constitutional texts.").
76 Id. at 1715 ("[ilt seems quite likely that the adoption of constitutional texts,
like the enactment of statutes, entails bargaining and compromise over the reach and
structure of the policy under consideration."). "This conclusion holds, moreover,
whether or not the text represents, at one extreme, a closely divided legislative vote
over a matter of economic self-interest or, at the other, a broad social consensus over
a question of high constitutional principle." Id. at 1715 n.190.
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rough compromise with which no one was entirely happy, but which
most everyone could accept.
77
The notion that the Constitution enacts a series of political com-
promises has long been recognized. Max Farrand famously called the
Constitution a "bundle of compromises," a conclusion so uncontrover-
sial it has become a widely used cliche. 78 Still, it is striking to note how
Farrand's account of the Convention corresponds to the assumptions
of public choice:
The document which the convention presented to congress
and to the country as the proposed new constitution for the United
States was a surprise to everybody. No one could have foreseen the
processes by which it had been constructed, and no one could have
foretold the compromises by which the differences of opinion had
been reconciled, and accordingly no one could have forecast the
result .... Out of what was almost a hodge-podge of resolutions
they had made a presentable document, but it was not a logical
piece of work. No document originating as this had and developed
as this had been developed could be logical or even consistent.
79
One could scarcely contrive a better account of the "unintentional
legislation" that public choice theorists predict will emerge from mul-
timember bodies.80 Modern textualists have recognized the centrality
of compromise to the Constitution. 8 1
77 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1353 (footnote omitted).
78 MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 201
(1913); see also JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 15 (1996) (characterizing the
constitutional convention as "a process of bargaining and compromise" rather than
an "advanced seminar in constitutional theory"); R.L. Schuyler, Agreement in the Federal
Convention, 31 POL. Sci. Q. 289, 289 (1916) ("Every American schoolboy has learned
about the 'compromises' of the Constitution, for they are set forth in every elemen-
tary text-book of American history.").
79 FARRAND, supra note 78, at 200-01; see also Max Farrand, Compromises of the Con-
stitution, 9 Am. HIsT. REV. 479, 482 (1904) ("[I] n that part of the plan of government
which provided for the organization of a federal judiciary, the provision that 'Con-
gress may... establish' inferior courts was phrased in this way to render it acceptable
to those who favored the establishment of such courts, and to those who insisted that
such tribunals would interfere with the rightful jurisdiction of the state courts" (quot-
ing U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1)); cf Michael C. Doff, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional
Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 933 n.220 (2003) (describing "the public choice
account of lawmaking, in which the law is rarely more than an incoherent bundle of
compromises").
80 See WALDRON, supra note 56, at 124-29; see also Schuyler, supra note 78, at 289
(observing that many constitutional provisions "which are seemingly straightforward
and artless rest in reality upon compromises, often labored and tortuous").
81 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1119, 1125 (1998) ("The Constitution itself is not based on a unitary theory; the
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In applying these insights, then, what accounts for Manning and
Marshall's singular focus on "precise" constitutional texts? One
answer is by analogy to a rule of thumb for statutory interpretation
which holds that textual detail signals narrow interest group compro-
mise.8 2 Manning takes the specificity of constitutional language as an
indicator that a particular amendment "addresses a specific question
and resolves it in a precise way."'83 The problem, however, is that the
context of the Constitution is different from ordinary legislation.8 4
Constitutional provisions cannot be considered in isolation as easily as
different pieces of legislation. All provisions, after all, form a single
constitutional scheme. Specific provisions modify broad ones, and
they may have been understood precisely in light of their effect on
larger principles.8 5 One cannot reach the original understanding of
the Eleventh Amendment, for example, without an understanding of
the provision it modified, Article 111.86 To read one textually and the
other more liberally distorts an original understanding in which the
two provisions had a combined effect. Moreover, there is little cause
in the constitutional context for taking a detailed text to trump a
broadly worded one simply because the former is more easily parsed.
As textualists acknowledge, the presuppositions and background con-
ventions of interpretive communities often affect the common under-
standing of a text's plain language.87 The drafting and ratification of
Framers did not share a single vision but reached a complex compromise."); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 861 (1989) (describing the
Constitution as an imperfect "political compromise").
82 See Easterbrook, Economic System, supra note 41, at 16 ("One way to approach
the problem is to ask whether the statute is specific or general. The more detailed the
law, the more evidence of interest-group compromise and therefore the less liberty
judges possess. General-interest statutes, on the other hand, are designed to vest dis-
cretion in courts, to transfer the locus of decision .. .
83 Manning, supra note 21, at 1736.
84 See Scalia, supra note 55, at 37 (noting that "[i] n textual interpretation, context
is everything, and the context of the Constitution" is distinctive).
85 SeeJackson, supra note 2, at 997 ("Since the entire Constitution of 1787 was in
a sense founded on compromises, the effort to distinguish among its provisions and
associated amendments on such a basis [as the distinction between compromise and
principle] may be one doomed to failure.").
86 And this understanding may depend, for that matter, on an original under-
standing of how Chisholm affected Article III. See infra Part III.
87 See Coan, supra note 11, at 2519 n.52 ("Widely held political and philosophical
presuppositions are often more significant determinants of meaning than dictionary
definitions. Thus, especially in interpreting historically remote constitutional provi-
sions, it makes little sense to accord text the kind of presumptive weight that Marshall
and Manning argue for.").
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the Constitution surely involved compromise over political and philo-
sophical precepts, and judges ought to honor those bargains as well.88
Broadly worded provisions are as likely as any other constitutional
text to embody a legislative compromise that requires continued
respect. For that reason, the "bundle of compromises" behind the
Constitution-often invoked as an argument against originalism 89 -
actually counsels its more consistent application.
B. Article III as an Ambiguous Text
If Article III is not ambiguous, however, no interpretive work is
necessary because a textualist would simply "accept the plain meaning
of the language used."90 This is Lawrence Marshall's reading of Arti-
cle 111.91 Indeed, a scholarly consensus maintains that the plain lan-
guage of Article III supports the holding of Chisholm, at least with
respect to the question of jurisdiction. "[F] rom a textual standpoint,"
writes John J. Gibbons, "the suggestion that states were immune from
suit in federal court seems preposterous on its face."
92
But how preposterous is it, really? As Manning writes, "communi-
cation inevitably draws on established (but unstated) assumptions
shared by the relevant linguistic community." 93 These can take the
form of exceptions to a general policy. "When exceptions to an
imperative are part of an antecedent understanding between speaker
and listener that limits conditions of application, the exceptions are
part of the meaning of the imperative," explains Kent Greenawalt.
9 4
As noted above, a textualist would read an unqualified criminal stat-
ute's plain meaning to be qualified by the background defense of
88 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 998 ("Compromise is important; compromise
between competing principles is often essential to constitution making and mainte-
nance; security in enforcement of compromises may be important for future bargain-
ing; and compromises may have become embedded in a legal landscape and require
continued enforcement in order to promote stability and coherence.").
89 See, e.g., RAKoVE, supra note 78, at 6 ("Both the framing of the Constitution in
1787 and its ratification by the states involved processes of collective decision-making
whose outcomes necessarily reflected a bewildering array of intentions and expecta-
ions, hopes and fears, genuine compromises and agreements to disagree.").
90 JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (1987).
91 See Marshall, supra note 21, at 1346.
92 Gibbons, supra note 37, at 1895; see also ORTH, supra note 90, at 28 ("The safest
course would seem to be to accept the plain meaning of the language used."); Amar,
supra note 8, at 1469 (calling the Chisholm Court's interpretation of Article III "impec-
cable");Jackson, supra note 37, at 49 ("Chisholm was in all likelihood correctly decided
as to the question of jurisdiction. . ").
93 Manning, supra note 41, at 2470.
94 Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (1990).
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necessity because legislatures "enact criminal and tort statutes in light
of established norms of defense, which frame the background social
understanding of such statutes among the legal community." 95 By the
same token, "[c] riminal prohibitions do not generally apply to reason-
able enforcement actions by officers of the law."
9 6
Marshall insists that without an explicit textual provision for state
sovereign immunity, it cannot be a constitutional doctrine. Article III
contains "absolute language that admit[s] no exception for suits
against states," he writes. "[I] t cannot seriously be suggested that arti-
cle III, or any other part of the body of the Constitution, lends sup-
port to the Court's creation of a constitutional doctrine of state
sovereign immunity that extends beyond the narrow dictates of the
eleventh amendment. '97 But there is no textual warrant for federal
sovereign immunity, either, and yet almost no one questions its exis-
tence. 98 That's because there is little doubt that the United States is
sovereign (even though that presupposition, too, lacks a textual basis)
and immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty. 99 The question
for states, then, is to what extent they too are sovereign under the
"plan of the convention." As Alexander Hamilton wrote:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as
one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the govern-
ment of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a sur-
render of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain
with the States .... 100
Theories about the status of state sovereignty under the Constitu-
tion abound. One theory holds that the federal and state govern-
ments are sovereign in their respective spheres.' 10 Others argue that
95 Manning, supra note 41, at 2468.
96 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998).
97 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1347.
98 See, e.g., Coan, supra note 11, at 2534 (calling federal sovereign immunity "a
doctrine with an impeccable historical pedigree that is very rarely questioned by
courts").
99 THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 16, at 487-88.
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 16, at 76
(arguing that the Constitution "leaves in [the states'] possession certain exclusive and
very important portions of sovereign power"); THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 16, at 198 ("[A]s the plan of the convention aims only at a
partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the
rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively
delegated to the United States."); THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra
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sovereign immunity is a relic of monarchical rule; since sovereignty in
the United States resides with the people, state governments cannot
invoke its privileges. 10 2 On the other hand, under a system of popular
sovereignty, suits against a state can be seen as suits against the sover-
eign people of the state in their collective capacity-making immunity
appropriate. I0 Still others might argue that, in adopting the Consti-
tution, states surrendered their sovereignty entirely to the union 10 4 or
that they retained it in full.
This appears to be a question of principle or political theory, but
it is not. The creation of a "partly federal and partly national" demo-
cratic government under a written constitution was an unprecedented
undertaking. 05 No formal precepts dictated its form. Some doc-
trines-separation of powers, judicial review, individual rights-
became part of the structure, but there is no reason to presume that
they all proceeded from a single conceptual framework. Thus, when
Amar condemns state sovereign immunity as "an inexplicable throw-
back to the jurisdictional regime of the Articles of Confederation,"' 06
it may in fact be such a throwback, explained by the necessity of Fed-
eralist compromise with the Antifederalists. The only relevant ques-
tions are whether and in what way it was understood to limit Article
III.
The status of state sovereign immunity prior to the Constitution
was clear. "Whatever the framers' understanding of Article III," writes
Christopher T. Graebe, "there seems to have been general agreement
note 16, at 245 ("[Federal] jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only,
and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects.").
102 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (characterizing state sovereign immunity as "an anachronistic and
unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal system"); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 454 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) ("To the Constitution of the United States the
term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown."); Amar, supra note 8, at 1480 ("[T]he
Supreme Court's vision of state sovereign immunity warps the very notion of govern-
ment under law."); Barnett, supra note 21, at 1758 ("If nothing else, Chisholm teaches
that the concept of sovereignty as residing in the body of the people, as individuals,
was alive at the time of the founding .... ); Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 1201
("Sovereign immunity is an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be
eliminated from American law.").
103 See Nelson, supra note 35, at 1584 & n.115.
104 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) ("[W]hen a State, by
adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the
United States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.").
105 See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 16, at 246.
106 Amar, supra note 8, at 1477.
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that the states had enjoyed sovereign immunity under the Articles. '10 7
Federalists and Antifederalists alike concurred in the judgment that
immunity to suit is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Even Attor-
ney General Edmund Randolph, who represented Chisholm against
Georgia, acknowledged that under "the confederation ... the States
retained their exemption from the forensic jurisdiction of each other,
and . . . of the United States themselves. 10 8 Randolph even asserted
that the principle of sovereign immunity retained continuing force
under the Constitution. The national government, he argued, still
enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit: "I assert, that it will not follow,
from these premises, that the United States themselves may be sued.
For the head of a confederacy is not within the reach of the judicial
authorities of its inferior members. It is exempted by its peculiar pre-
eminencies."'109
Randolph concluded that the principle of sovereign immunity
could not logically apply to states because they had surrendered the
relevant part of their sovereignty in joining the union. "I acknowl-
edge, and shall always contend, that the States are sovereignties," he
said. "But with the free will, arising from absolute independence, they
might combine in Government for their own happiness.... The limi-
tations, which the Federal Government is admitted to impose upon
their powers, are diminutions of sovereignty, at least equal to the mak-
ing of them defendants."' 10 In support of this assertion, Randolph
adverted to "the spirit of the Constitution" and argued that its pur-
pose would be frustrated if compulsive suits against states were disal-
lowed."' The Constitution, he noted, contains prohibitions on state
action that would violate individual rights, harm other states, or act in
derogation of the general sovereignty. If states were to act in this fash-
ion, he argued, "redress goes only half way," and some "unconstitu-
tional actions must pass without censure, unless States can be made
defendants."1
2
Randolph, then, read Article III in light of a background princi-
ple of sovereign immunity. But he gave to that principle a purposive
interpretation, concluding that the states did not possess the relevant
sort of sovereignty and therefore fell outside the principle. "IT] here
is nothing in the nature of sovereignties, combined as those of America
107 Christopher T. Graebe, The Federalism of James Iredell in Historical Context, 69
N.C. L. REV. 251, 256 (1990).
108 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 423 (argument of counsel).
109 Id. at 425.
110 Id. at 423.
111 Id. at 421-22.
112 Id. at 422.
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are, to prevent the words of the Constitution, if they naturally mean,
what I have asserted, from receiving an easy and usual construc-
tion."113 Thus, the background principle of sovereign immunity does
not qualify the language of Article III with respect to states ("in which
a State shall be Party"), and "party" must mean either plaintiff or
defendant. On the other hand, according to Randolph, the back-
ground principle of sovereign immunity does qualify the language of
Article III with respect to the United States ("to which the United
States shall be a Party"), and "party" must mean plaintiff but not
defendant. 114
Justice Iredell, the lone dissenter in Chisholm, concluded that it
was unnecessary to reach the constitutional question of Article III's
reach in order to dispose of the case, though he pronounced himself
strongly against any construction of [the Constitution], which will
admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State
for the recovery of money. I think every word in the Constitution
may have its full effect without involving this consequence, and that
nothing but express words, or an insurmountable implication
(neither of which I consider, can be found in this case) would
authorise the deduction of so high a power.
115
In this way, Iredell also read Article III in light of a background
principle of sovereign immunity. But unlike Randolph's purposive
interpretation, Iredell did not evaluate its scope or purposes-nor did
he analyze the substantive merits and conceptual fit of applying the
principle to states. He simply acknowledged that prior to the Consti-
tution, states' amenability to suit was generally understood to be lim-
ited by sovereign immunity."l 6 If the Constitution overturned so
significant and widely recognized a prerogative of states, a reasonable
observer would expect it to do so expressly. Iredell would not infer
such a dramatic alteration of legal norms from a purported lack of fit
between the Constitution's scope and its putative purposes.
113 Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
114 Id. at 421.
115 Id. at 449-50 (opinion of Iredell, J.) ("So far as this great question affects the
Constitution itself, if the present afforded, consistently with the particular grounds of
my opinion, a proper occasion for a decision upon it, I would not shrink from its
discussion. But it is of extreme moment that no judge should rashly commit himself
upon important questions, which it is unnecessary for him to decide. My opinion
being, that even if the Constitution would admit of the exercise of such a power, a
new law is necessary for the purpose, since no part of the existing law applies, this
alone is sufficient to justify my determination in the present case.").
116 Id. at 433.
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This approach corresponds to textualist statutory interpreta-
tion.11 7 That Iredell was interpreting not a statute, but an ambiguous
constitutional provision and a background legal norm, makes the
approach no less applicable. When an ambiguous constitutional pro-
vision such as Article III addresses the scope of a substantive power
(federal jurisdiction) or procedural concept (state amenity to suit), its
public meaning likely proceeds as much from generally understood
principles as its particular language.
As it happens, Iredell wrote an initial draft of his Chisholm dissent
that more clearly addresses Randolph's constitutional arguments and
illustrates his textualist approach to Article 111.118 Iredell declined to
infer constitutional purpose from the legislative history where it could
also be used to justify a contrary result. Instead, he inferred from the
subject matter what use of language would be reasonably expected:
The A.G. observed, The Convention had twice the opportunity
to speak expressly, but they did not. What if the Cony. had twice an
opportunity to convey this authority expressly, & did not. Are we to
force such a construction upon them? Really, this is treating the
subject as of very little consequence. But if ever there was a case,
where the Convention should have spoken out explicitly, if they
meant what is ascribed to them, this certainly was the case. Where
whole Sovereignties are to be brought to a Bar ofJustice in the very
same manner, & without any distinction, as single Individuals....
We must shew our Voucher for the exercise of so high an
authority. 119
Moreover, he declined to embrace the suggestion that the word
"party" has different meanings within the same article by virtue of
Randolph's political theory of sovereignty. The fact that such a theory
would make nonsense of the text suggests its invalidity:
The word "Party" was mentioned. This it was said was as clear
as day light. Admit it to be so, in the sense of this observation. The
117 See Manning, supra note 21, at 1689-90 (noting that textualists "emphasize that
a seeming lack of fit may reflect the fruits of an unrecorded legislative compromise or
the byproduct of complicated legislative bargaining, rather than a reflection of impre-
cisely expressed legislative intent").
118 James Iredell, Observations on "this great Constitutional Question" (Feb. 18,
1793), in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, at 186, 186-87 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY]. Iredell may have read this draft opinion from the bench. Id. at
186 n.AD. This source shows the original text and replicates Justice Iredell's editing
marks on that text. The quotes from this source in this Article omit the editing
marks; instead, the quotes reflect the final textJustice Iredell intended, as evidenced
by his edits.
119 Id. at 188-89 (emphasis removed) (footnotes omitted).
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meaning of that undoubtedly is, that Party must mean either [Plain-
tiff] or [Defendant]. The same word is used as to the U.S. The U.S.
therefore may be either [Plaintiff] or [Defendant]. [No,?] says the
Atty Gen, I once thought so, but am now convinced it cannot be
applied to the U.S. since they cannot be sued in their own courts,
,ithout consent, from the very nature of a superior Sovereignty.
Why then is the same word used as to both? Before this Constitu-
tion was passed, a State was no more liable to be sued in this man-
ner than the U.S. Its Sovereignty equally protected it. The
Convention therefore either meant the same thing as to both, or
they used words idly & at random . . . . [T]he very same word
applied to one Sovereignty must have the same construction as
applied to another .... If they did not, by one expression, convey
this authority by implication as to one, they did not to be sure, by
the very same expression, as to the other.
12 0
As to Randolph's theory of state sovereignty post-ratification, Ire-
dell took it as mere assertion. "I admit that a Sovereign Power may
yield a part of its Sovereignty," Iredell wrote with respect to Ran-
dolph's contention about states' surrender of sovereignty. "Shew that
the separate States have done this[,] the point is settled. The Fact
here assumed is the very thing in question."1 21 Iredell would not pre-
sume, on the basis of speculation about the theory behind the Consti-
tution, that the states had surrendered their sovereignty. Some actual
evidence that this was the import of their decision to ratify would be
required. Iredell declined to extend the scope of constitutional provi-
sions to accord with an apparent purpose:
But the A.G. has taken very high ground, when speaking of the
Spirit of the Constitution.
... I shall not attempt to follow him in the whole of his argu-
ment as to this point. So far as his argument went to shew the
importance of Nations, as well as Individuals, observing moral sanc-
tions, I heard him with pleasure. But, alas! such is the situation of
Mankind, we cannot find a remedy for every thing. We must bear
evils as well as we can that we can find no means of redressing but
by introducing greater Evils. I do not believe that the Cony. had in
its view to remedy such as the A.G. described in such strong colours.
A State doing injury to the Citizens of other States or Foreigners is
to be sure a supposable case, but it is scarcely supposeable, I think
(if at all) but by means of some act of the Legislature (for no infer-
ior authority I think can bind a State), in which case we are involved
in this dilemma. If the act be consistent with the Const. of the par-
120 Id. at 189-90 (fifth alteration in original) (emphasis removed) (footnotes
omitted).
121 Id. at 191.
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ticular State, & the U.S., it is binding upon all, and this Court hath
no means of redressing it. If it be inconsistent with either, the act is
utterly void, and can operate as no bar to the Individual right. This,
I take it, is the very manner in which the Const. intended all Laws of
the U.S. (except in the peculiar instance of a Controversy between 2
or more States & perhaps one or two other instances) should oper-
ate-upon Individuals & not States.
122
Iredell aimed to preserve the balance the Constitution struck
between the sovereignty of the states and the rights of individuals. He
would not alter the terms of the bargain because the remedies, in this
case, seemed incomplete or not fully satisfactory. Individual rights
still had effect as defenses to state action, and the intuition that
redress would "go [] only half way"'123 in some cases did not justify the
conclusion that the Constitution must intend a fuller or more com-
plete remedy. The Constitution, after all, may "go[] thus far and no
further in pursuit of a goal"I 24-especially where, as here, it balances
competing goals. A more "complete" remedy could "introduce[e]
greater Evils." Thus, the mention of a right or limitation on state
action in the Constitution does not demand the conclusion that "the
Conv. had in its view to remedy" by every possible means.
125
The next subpart argues that understanding Article III as the
product of legislative compromise supports Iredell's cautious
approach to constitutional interpretation. Whatever conclusion one
draws about the meaning of Article III, however, its text is not unam-
biguous on its face. Randolph insisted that the word "between" refers
to two parties. 12 6 But, as Iredell noted, the word is given its full mean-
ing by referring to any controversy between the two parties that may
come before a court. It need not change the judicial power to reach
cases previously thought to be beyond the reach of courts. 127 In this
122 Id. at 190 (emphasis removed) (footnotes omitted). Note that Iredell,
responding to Randolph's concern that states may violate individual rights, imagines
that federal jurisdiction can only reach a "State doing injury to the Citizens of other
States or Foreigners" and does not include citizens of their own states. Id.
123 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 422 (1793) (argument of counsel).
124 Hrubec v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995).
125 Iredell, supra note 118, at 190.
126 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419, 420-21.
127 See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 533 (statement of James Madison)
(arguing that jurisdiction "will not go beyond the cases where they may be parties");
Charles Jarvis's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, INDEP. CIRON. (Bos-
ton), Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 436,
437 ("Is it not then most natural to infer, that the Constitution was not intended to
create occasions upon which its power was to be exerted, but to operate simply upon
those which had an actual existence.").
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respect, Caleb Nelson has argued that, as originally understood, a
"case" or "controversy" did not exist unless the court had personal
jurisdiction over both parties-which, of course, it lacked over non-
consenting states.
128
Nelson provides a textual hook for a background presumption of
state sovereign immunity. Indeed, broadly worded provisions may
often have a more limited meaning than their literal terms suggest by
virtue of established terms of art. Yet people and legislatures always
communicate in light of "settled nuances or background conventions
that qualify the literal meaning of language and, in particular, of legal
language."1 29 If a school principal, say, were to announce that he will
punish "any fighting between students" with suspension-and that
"any party to a fight" should be taken to his office immediately-one
would not naturally take him to include students boxing in gym class,
or students at other schools, or fights that occur off campus. At least,
if he did mean that, one would expect him to say so explicitly.
The authorization of jurisdiction "between two or more States"
did not present the same problem for Iredell, since that had already
existed under the Articles of Confederation. 3 0 As Randolph acknowl-
edged in his argument, under the Articles "the States retained their
exemption from the forensic jurisdiction of [the United States]
except under a peculiar modification . . 131 If the Constitution
meant to change that distribution of authority, Iredell reasoned, one
would expect a clear statement to that effect.
1 32
Randolph, as noted, was comfortable modifying the literal lan-
guage of Article III with a background presumption of sovereign
immunity for the United States-he only argued it didn't apply to
states. 133 One would naturally read Article III, of course, to be limited
128 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1565-66.
129 Manning, supra note 41, at 2393.
130 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 2 (U.S. 1781); see also 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 28, at 532 (statement of James Madison) ("The next case, where
two or more states are the parties, is not objected to. Provision is made for this by the
existing Articles of Confederation, and there can be no impropriety in referring such
disputes to this tribunal."). Suits between sovereignties also seem to have been under-
stood differently than suits by individuals against sovereigns. See, e.g., Letter from
James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 217, 221 (Phil., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865) (expressing wonder
that the Supreme Court determined that "the dignity of a State was not more com-
promitted by being made a party against a private person than against a co-ordinate
Party").
131 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 423 (argument of counsel).
132 Id. at 449-50 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
133 See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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by other background principles of justiciability.13 4 No one expected
Article III's grant of jurisdiction "to all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls" to eliminate or waive the diplo-
matic immunity of those parties.'8 5 The plain language of Article III,
similarly, did not entail the elimination of sovereign immunity.
136
Indeed, the other Justices in Chisholm, like Randolph, depended
on a purposive reading of the Constitution to conclude-despite no
mention of state sovereignty in the text-that the Constitution had
eliminated the sovereignty states previously enjoyed and all its attrib-
utes. Iredell, on the other hand, required a textual basis for that
judgment.1
3 7
The contrast between Iredell's textualist reading and the major-
ity's purposive account of Article III should give partisans of the liter-
alist approach to the Eleventh Amendment pause. To conclude, as
Marshall does, that "all indications in the body of the Constitution are
against state immunity from federal jurisdiction,"'' 3 8 one must either
read it purposively to conform to some nontextual political theory or
else read it literally to exclude those established background assump-
134 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 533 (statement of James
Madison) ("A subject of a foreign power, having a dispute with a citizen of this state,
may carry it to the federal court; but an alien enemy cannot bring suit at all.").
135 SeeJAcOBS, supra note 12, at 21.
136 In an analogous case, the Court has inferred that "thejurisdiction conferred by
the constitution upon this court, in cases to which a state is a party, is limited to
controversies of a civil nature" not only from the use of "cases" and "controversies" as
terms of art, but also from the background common law doctrine that one state does
not enforce the penal law of a foreign state. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S.
265, 287-89, 297 (1888) (holding that "notwithstanding the comprehensive words of
the constitution, the mere fact that a state is the plaintiff is not a conclusive test that
the controversy is one in which this court is authorized to grant relief against another
state or her citizens" and that the grant of 'Judicial power" is limited by "settled princi-
ples of public and international law"); see also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666
(1892) (citing "the fundamental maxim of international law . . . 'The courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another"'). Pelican has been partially overruled on
the grounds that "the obligation to pay taxes is not penal." Milwaukee County v. M.E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935). See generally AnthonyJ. Bellia Jr., Congressional
Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 CEO. L.J. 949, 961 (2006) (discussing the "sover-
eign prerogative of a state to exclusively enforce its own penal laws").
137 In addition to the assumptions of modern textualism, Iredell's reading could
be justified by reference to rules of construction given by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. See Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theoy of the Ninth Amendment, 60
STAN. L. REV. 895, 919 (2008) ("Embedded in text of the Ninth, thus, are two separate
forbidden rules of construction: First, the fact of enumeration must not be read to
imply the necessity of enumeration. Second, the fact of enumeration must not be read
to suggest the superiority of enumeration.").
138 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1346.
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tions against which it was originally understood. The ratification
debates (and Chisholm, for that matter) may reveal disagreement over
the implications of Article III for state suability, but partisans on both
sides of the question understood the Article in connection with a well-
established background principle of state sovereign immunity. Read-
ing the Article literally, apart from those background conventions that
informed its meaning, misses the original understanding. Textualists
should at least consider the background assumptions against which
the text was originally understood. How to think about the disagree-
ment over Article III's implications is the subject of the next subpart.
C. Article III as a Constitutional Compromise
It is ironic that the textualist case against a broad constitutional
principle of sovereign immunity rests on honoring a possible "unre-
corded legislative compromise" that may have been essential to the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. 3 9 In fact, the evidence sug-
gests that the recognition of such a principle was part of a compro-
mise that was essential to the ratification of the Constitution.
The statements of Hamilton, Madison, and John Marshall with
respect to state sovereign immunity under the Constitution have often
been taken to be probative of original intent.140 These statements
include Hamilton's assurances in the Federalist Papers.'4 1 Madison, at
the Virginia ratifying convention, said of Article III:
Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of
another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is
not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only oper-
ation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against
a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court. This will give
139 See Manning, supra note 21, at 1690; Marshall, supra note 21, at 1353-54.
140 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-18 (1999) (citing Hamilton,
Madison, and Marshall as evidence of the importance of state sovereign immunity to
the ratification of the Constitution); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70-71 &
n.13 (1996) (citing Madison and Hamilton as evidence of the intent to include state
sovereign immunity in the Constitution); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-24
(1934) (outlining the clear intentions of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall with
regard to sovereign immunity); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1890) (same).
141 THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 16, at 487-88 ("It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the govern-
ment of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger
intimated must be merely ideal.").
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satisfaction to individuals, as it will prevent citizens, on whom a state
may have a claim, being dissatisfied with the state courts....
... It appears to me that this can have no operation but this-
to give a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a
state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cogni-
zance of it.1
4 2
He noted, furthermore, "I do not conceive that any controversy
can ever be decided, in these courts, between an American state and a
foreign state, without the consent of the parties. If they consent, pro-
vision is here made.' 1 43 John Marshall provided a similar reading:
I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the
bar of the federal court .... It is not rational to suppose that the sover-
eign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable
states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I con-
tend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they,
there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be defendant-if an
individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a state,
though he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be
avoided. I see a dfficulty in making a state defendant, which does not pre-
vent its being plaintiff.
14 4
In cases between states and foreign states, he said, "[t] he previous
consent of the parties is necessary.
'145
Scholars have responded to these statements by insisting that,
while they "certainly convey[] an endorsement of state sovereign
immunity," Madison and Marshall were "merely dissembling"1 46 and
their arguments were "disingenuous.' 47 Lawrence Marshall, too,
refers to "Madison's probably disingenuous attempt to convince the
Virginia convention that sovereign immunity was not affected by cer-
tain portions of article III."148 Manning, meanwhile, writes,
"Although important figures in various ratifying debates-including
Hamilton (qua Publius), Madison, and Marshall-gave broadly
worded assurances that states would retain their traditional immunity
from unconsented suits after Article III's adoption, opinion on that
question was hardly uniform." 149 He also regards those assurances as
142 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 533 (statement of James Madison)
(emphasis added).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 555-56 (statement of John Marshall) (emphasis added).
145 Id. at 557.
146 Gibbons, supra note 37, at 1906.
147 Jackson, supra note 37, at 47.
148 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1371.
149 Manning, supra note 21, at 1674.
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probably disingenuous: "For me, in any case, scattered remarks in the
ratifying debates demand a heavy discount: One cannot know... to
what extent the utterers shaped their contributions in light of strate-
gic concerns in decidedly political ratification contests."1 50
Why this should matter is unclear. The states did not ratify
Madison and Marshall's beliefs about the Constitution. Nor did Hamil-
ton's theories about the "plan of the convention" pass unadulterated
into law. 151 Statements by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall are com-
pelling not because they meant them, but because they provide a read-
ing of Article 111-and of state sovereign immunity under the
Constitution more generally-that may represent the ratifiers' under-
standing of the text they passed into law.
1 52
Indeed, it would be less probative of the meaning of the Constitu-
tion that Madison and Marshall believed what they said than that they
felt they needed to say it to win ratification. Manning writes of the consti-
tutional amendment process, "By design, this process seeks to ensure
that a small minority of society or, more accurately, several distinct
small minorities have the right to veto constitutional change or to
insist upon compromise as the price of assent."1 53 He notes that "the
process for adopting the original Constitution, although rather impro-
vised, also assigned political minorities (mainly small states' residents)
a disproportionate right to insist on compromise."
154
So the view that sovereign immunity survived Article III need not
have been widely held or even genuinely believed by Madison, Hamil-
ton, or Marshall to be authoritative. If there was a ratification-block-
ing minority that would not have assented to ratification of Article III
without the assurance that state sovereign immunity remained intact,
then state sovereign immunity must be taken to be part of the original
compromise that was essential to Article III's ratification.
155
150 Id. at 1674 n.42.
151 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
152 See RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 98-99 (2004)
(explaining that the "public meaning of the words of the Constitution, as understood
by the ratifying conventions and the general public" should prevail over the inten-
tions of the framers); Scalia, supra note 55, at 38 (explaining that the writings of
framers are probative as indications of original understanding, not of intent).
153 Manning, supra note 21, at 1671.
154 Id. at 1702 n.143.
155 Cf id. at 1720 ("At a minimum, before ascribing a broader legally effective
intention to the carefully drawn language of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
must ask whether it is conceivable that one-third of either house (or, less likely, one-
quarter of the state legislatures) might have preferred the narrower immunity embed-
ded in the text.").
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Statements at the ratification debates obviously involved strategic
behavior:
[T] he proposed Constitution faced serious ratification obstacles. In
four states, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and
New York, the ratifying conventions contained a significant majority
of Anti-Federalist sentiment. A fifth state, Rhode Island, did not
even bother to call a convention; the Constitution was submitted
directly to-and rejected by-an electorate known to be over-
whelmingly hostile. Had the ratification proceedings moved along
a different sequence, our Constitution might not have been
ratified ....
. . . The Constitution's opponents most feared "consolidated"
national government. For these critics, the states [were] pri-
mary.... they [were] equal, and ... they possessed the main weight
of political power....
. . . Responding quickly to Anti-Federalist sentiment, the Federalists
deflected the state-centered attack by, in effect, embracing it. Generally, they
acknowledged the political and legal priority of the states .... 156
In the debate over the Constitution, Antifederalists at first hewed to a
strictly confederal principle because they believed that dual or coordi-
nate sovereignty, imperia in imperio, was impossible. The "characteris-
tic Federalist position was to deny that the choice lay between
confederation and consolidation and to contend that in fact the Con-
stitution provided a new form, partly national and partly federal." 157
That was the argument of the Federalist Papers and Madison at the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention. 15 8 "[T] he Federalists had the usual motive
of the political debater to take as much as he can of his opponent's
ground. Nevertheless, it is striking how widely the Federalists adopted
the view of the Union as a coming together of sovereign states."159 In
this way, "the nationalists who met at Philadelphia became federalists as
they sought to translate their vision of national power and prosperity
into a politically acceptable constitutional design.' 60 The Antifeder-
alist position also shifted. Under the influence of Federalist argu-
ments, the Antifederalists "urged the importance of a strict division of
power and even something like a divided sovereignty, the possibility of
156 Monaghan, supra note 69, at 148-49 (some alterations in original) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157 HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FoR 12 (Murray Dry
ed., 1981).
158 See supra note 18.
159 HerbertJ. Storing, The 'Other'Federalist Papers: A Preliminary Sketch, in TOWARD A
MoRE PERFECT UNION 77, 84-85 (Joseph M. Bessette ed., 1995).
160 CATHY D. MATSON & PETER S. ONUF, A UNION OF INTERESTS 101 (1990).
i168 [VOL. 84:3
ARTICLE III AS A CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE
which their early strictly federal argument had denied."'' 1 To assume
away this compromise-and, for example, to read the Constitution
according to a purist form of Federalist "popular sovereignty"-dis-
honors the bargain struck at ratification. 1
6 2
The four state ratifying conventions dominated by Antifederal-
ists-New Hampshire, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and New
York-plus the staunchly antifederalist Rhode Island represent a rati-
fication-blocking minority in a process that required the assent of nine
states. In Virginia, the Antifederalists had a slight advantage. 163 The
margin of approval of the Constitution was exceedingly close: "ten
votes in Virginia (89-79) and New Hampshire (78-68), and only three
in New York (30-27). '"164 Massachusetts ratified by nineteen votes
(187-168) .165
Two states, at least, ratified the Constitution on the understand-
ing that state sovereign immunity survived Article III. To its resolu-
tion ratifying the Constitution, New York attached a declaration of
understanding. "We, the delegates of the people of the state of New
York," it read, "[d]o declare and make known .. .[t]hat the judicial
power of the United States, in cases in which a state may be a party,
does not extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by
any person against a state."' 6 6 For good measure, the New York con-
vention also noted its understanding "[t]hat the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States, or of any other court to be insti-
tuted by the Congress, is not in any case to be increased, enlarged, or
extended, by any faction, collusion, or mere suggestion .... ,,6 7 And
New York explicitly made its ratification contingent on this
understanding:
Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights afore-
said cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations
aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution, and in confi-
dence that the amendments which shall have been proposed to the
said Constitution will receive an early and mature consideration,-
161 STORING, supra note 157, at 33.
162 See Amar, supra note 8, at 1426-27; cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751
(1999) (noting that the Constitution "'split[] the atom of sovereignty'" (quoting
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999))); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,
725 (1869) ("[T]he preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their govern-
ments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation
of the Union and the maintenance of the National government.").
163 JACOBS, supra note 12, at 32.
164 Monaghan, supra note 69, at 149 n.154.
165 JACOBS, supra note 12, at 30.
166 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 327-29.
167 Id. at 329.
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We, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people
of the state of New York, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify
the said Constitution.'
16 8
The assurances of Madison and other Framers must have traveled
widely, for in its ratification resolution (submitted to Congress in
1790), Rhode Island also declared this understanding of Article III.
Among its proposed amendments, the Rhode Island convention
included this:
It is declared by the Convention, that the judicial power of the
United States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not
extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any per-
son against a state; but, to remove all doubts or controversies
respecting the same, that it be especially expressed, as a part of the
Constitution of the United States, that Congress shall not, directly
or indirectly, either by themselves or through the judiciary, inter-
fere with any one of the states, in the redemption of paper money
already emitted, and now in circulation, or in liquidating and dis-
charging the public securities of any one state; that each and every
state shall have the exclusive right of making such laws and regula-
tions for the before-mentioned purpose as they shall think
proper. 1
69
Virginia and North Carolina, meanwhile, proposed more exten-
sive amendments that would have entirely eliminated the provisions of
Article III creating federal jurisdiction over states and citizens of other
states as well as cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of
the United States.' 70 North Carolina, unlike Virginia, made adoption
168 Id.
169 Id. at 336.
170 The Virginia amendment read:
That the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such courts of admiralty as Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish in any of the different states. The judicial
power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States; to all cases
affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers, and consuls; to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United
States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states, and
between parties claiming lands under the grants of different states. In all
cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers, and consuls, and those
in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original juris-
diction; in all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction, as to matters of law only, except in cases of equity, and
of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, in which the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and
under such regulations, as the Congress shall make: but the judicial power of
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of its amendments a precondition of its ratification of the Constitu-
tion-even though it did actually ratify a year later. 171 Other states,
notably Massachusetts and New Hampshire, may have adopted resolu-
tions in support of state sovereign immunity. 172 Records of the Massa-
chusetts convention's debate on Article III are sparse, but later
newspaper accounts report that state amenity to suit was a primary
concern of the delegates, and the convention ratified the Constitution
only on the assurances of Rufus King and other Federalists that Article
III did not authorize suits by individuals against states. 173 "On the
the United States shall extend to no case where the cause of action shall
have originated before the ratification of the Constitution, except in dis-
putes between states about their territory, disputes between persons claiming
lands under the grants of different states, and suits for debts due to the
United States.
3 id. at 660-61; see also 4 id. at 246 (detailing North Carolina's amendment which had
minor, nonsubstantive differences).
171 JACOBS, supra note 12, at 38.
172 According to St. George Tucker, Massachusetts and New Hampshire also pro-
posed amendments "dissent[ing]" from state suability, ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the
Constitution of the United States, in BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES app. at 352 & n.* (St.
George Tucker ed., Phila., William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803), but the text
of these amendments seems to have been lost. See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1052
n.78.
173 Brutus, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), July 18, 1793, at 1, reprinted in 5 THE DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 392, 392 (noting that the possibility of suits
against states by individuals "was apprehended by many of the Members of the Massa-
chusetts Convention, when deliberating on that very clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion, respecting the judiciary power, but which apprehensions were said to be
groundless by the advocates of the Constitution, and the jealousies of the Members on
that subject, were laughed at, and treated as ridiculous by KING and others"); Demo-
crat, MASS. MERCURY (Boston), July 23, 1793, at 1, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 118, at 393, 393 ("In convention, when the Federal Constitution
was discussed, some of the members who had discernment to discover, and honesty to
expose the art used, by the constructors thereof, to gild over an article, which at once
destroys the SOVEREIGNTY of the states, and renders them no more than corporate
towns. A great civilian rose; and, in an harangue, of two hours length, endeavoured
to prove that, the article in debate, could not possibly bear the construction put upon
it by gentlemen .... " (footnotes omitted)); Marcus, MASS. MERCURY (Boston), July 16,
1793, at 1, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 389, 389 ("The
power which the Federal Government has, to call into their Courts, a Commonwealth or
a State, to answer to the demand of a foreigner... was powerfully opposed in the Con-
vention of this and other Commonwealths and States in the Union. It was debated in
our Convention with great strength and propriety .... This power in the Federal
Government, would not have been consented to by this commonwealth, but for Rufus
King. Esq. who 'pledged his honour,' in the State Convention, 'that the Convention at
Philadelphia never discovered a disposition to infringe on the Government of an indi-
vidual State .... .'" (quoting Senator Rufus King)); A Republican, The Crisis, No. XIII,
INDEP. CHRON., July 25, 1793, at 2, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
2009] 1171
1172 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:3
strength of this gentleman's opinion, the Article in the Constitution
was assented to but by a small majority.
174
Was there, then, at least a ratification-blocking minority that
depended on a construction of Article III as including state sovereign
immunity? New York and Rhode Island clearly and explicitly ratified
on the basis of that understanding. Virginia and North Carolina,
while plainly opposed to state amenity to suit, probably cannot be
taken to have expressed a view of Article III's meaning. Nevertheless,
one would have a ratification-blocking minority with only five vote
switches in Virginia, five in New Hampshire, and ten in Massachusetts.
The ratification votes were closest (or ratification was initially
rejected) in those states that actually held debates on Article III,175
which is where the Madison-Marshall reading of Article III was
advanced to counter Antifederalist attacks. In those states, Article III
"was made the subject of violent attacks by the opponents of the con-
stitution, attacks that were successfully met only by the solemn assur-
ances of its friends-Hamilton, Madison, Marshall-that such an
unheard of thing as a suit by an individual against a State was never
contemplated."
1 7 6
note 118, at 395, 396 ("Every person that attended the debates, knows that this ques-
tion was agitated in the Convention, and that it was treated as a visionary, antifederal
idea; and that both parties mutually and cordially consented, that the 'suability' of the
States was not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution; that it never could be
exercised, and in fact could never bear that construction.").
174 Marcus, supra note 173, at 389-90.
175 SeeJAcOBS, supra note 12, at 28 ("In at least six states-Pennsylvania, Massachu-
setts, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island-the provision received
attention."). Records of the Pennsylvania convention only contain one speech-by
James Wilson-on state suability rather than extended debate. See 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 28, at 515-45 (statement of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention on December 11, 1787). For New Hampshire, where one would
also expect such a debate, there are almost no records of the convention; only one
speech from the New Hampshire convention has been preserved. See Monaghan,
supra note 69, at 151 n.173.
176 SINGEWALD, supra note 35, at 18; see alsoJAMES SULLIVAN, OBSERVATIONS UPON
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1791), reprinted in 5 THE Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 21, 22 ("[T]here were great difficulties, in the
minds of many, respecting the construction of the judiciary powers contained in the
system then offered to the public. There were, however, men of learning and ingenu-
ity, who gave that part of the Constitution a construction which made many easy with
it .... It seemed then to be agreed, that the states, as states, were not liable to the
civil process of the supreme judicial of the Union .... ."); Letter from an Anonymous
Correspondent, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Apr. 4, 1793, at 2, reprinted in 5 THE Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 228, 228 ("When the persons in opposition to
the acceptance of the new Constitution hinged on the article respecting the power of
the Judiciary Department being so very extensive and alarming as to comprehend
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In truth, New York's rejection alone would have sunk the Consti-
tution-so important was its participation in the new government that
it was necessary to its success. Virginia, where Madison and Marshall
spoke, was similarly essential. 177 It is no surprise, then, that Federalists
publicly gave Article III a construction that would placate the Consti-
tution's opponents. "[R]atification opponents generally interpreted
the provision as constituting a dangerous extension of federal judicial
authority," explains Jacobs, "but most Federalists, commenting upon
the matter, denied this meaning."
178
In advancing his argument for a narrow reading of the Eleventh
Amendment, Manning writes:
"The more basic question ... is whether it is conceivable that
process considerations flowing from Article V's structure may have
given the Amendment's supporters strategic reasons for putting for-
ward such a precise amendment. Perhaps the political forces
responsible for shaping the Amendment's text believed, rightly or
not, that a more encompassing amendment might have passed less
surely or been ratified more slowly."
179
This logic applies equally to the construction given Article III in
the ratification debates. Some observers have concluded that "it may
be taken for granted that the constitution could never have been
adopted if it had been understood to contain the doctrine of Chisholm
v. Georgia."180 But whether it would have been adopted or not-and it
seems likely that it would not have-there is no question that process
considerations flowing from Article VII's structure gave the Constitu-
tion's supporters strategic reasons to put forward an immunity-
friendly construction of Article III. Rightly or wrongly, Federalists
believed that a ratification-blocking minority would have rejected a
more nationalist construction of the Constitution-and they shaped
the public understanding of Article III (along with other provisions)
in light of the ratification process.
It violates the process values underlying Article VII to conclude
that the Federalists were simply dissembling and pulled a "fast one"
over on their opponents at the ratifying conventions. Regardless of
the intent behind them, Federalist assurances became part of the
even the State itself, as a party on an action of debt; this was denied perem [p] torily by
the Federalists, as an absurdity in terms.").
177 Article VII, of course, does not give New York or Virginia, on their own, a right
of veto. But their importance further explains the Federalists' strategic behavior in
insisting that state sovereign immunity was implicit in Article III.
178 JAcoBs, supra note 12, at 28.
179 Manning, supra note 21, at 1721.
180 SINGEWALD, supra note 35, at 18-19.
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political compromise that led to passage of the Constitution. What's
more, the Article VII process seems to have produced a genuine com-
promise: partisans of exclusive state sovereignty and partisans of exclu-
sive national or popular sovereignty converged on a system of divided
sovereignty. 1s  "[T]he nationalists who met at Philadelphia became
federalists as they sought to translate their vision of national power and
prosperity into a politically acceptable constitutional design."'8 2 The
structure of Article VII is designed to produce just this sort of compro-
mise-a mutually agreeable constitutional framework. Courts should
aspire to a theory of adjudication that at least does not contradict
the apparent structural aims of a fairly carefully designed and elabo-
rately specified lawmaking process-whether it be the legislative
process of bicameralism and presentment or the processes pre-
scribed by Articles V and VII for the adoption of constitutional
texts.
18 3
Courts that did so aspire would be compelled to preserve the compro-
mise underlying Article III-recognizing the qualification of state sov-
ereign immunity-"lest they disturb some unrecorded concession
insisted upon by the minority or offered preemptively by the majority
as part of the price of assent."'
18 4
The process considerations of Article VII-which gives a veto
power to a minority of states, and aims for a compromise between
national and state interests-justify Justice Iredell's clear statement
rule: if the Constitution was to alter radically the relative authorities of
nation and state, one would expect it to do so explicitly. Articles VII
and V together aim, essentially, to make sure states know what they're
181 See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text. Some Federalists and Framers
advanced a state sovereignty view even in conventions that were not highly conten-
tious. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 197 (statement of Oliver
Elsworth) (arguing before the Connecticut ratifying convention that "[t] his Constitu-
tion does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity" but
"acts only upon delinquent individuals"). Ellsworth's view echoes Iredell's notion that
laws of the United States operate "upon Individuals & not States." See supra note 122
and accompanying text; see also Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra
note 130, at 222 ("It is particularly incumbent, in taking cognizance of cases arising
under the Constitution, and in which the laws and rights of the States may be
involved, to let the proceedings touch individuals only."). Iredell, too, was a Federal-
ist and supporter of the Constitution.
182 MATSON & ONUF, supra note 160, at 101.
183 Manning, supra note 21, at 1694.
184 Id. at 1736.
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getting into and that the bargain can't be changed after the fact. The
Court has invoked this sort of principle before.
185
It might be objected that there could have been an opposite rati-
fication-blocking faction that would not have ratified if they believed
state sovereign immunity was constitutional. There is no evidence of
such a faction, however, and it is not clear that the historical record
could have developed as it did if there had been. If proponents of the
Constitution had been evenly divided on the question one would
expect more debate between them on its meaning. 8 6 In this case,
proponents of the measure gave it one reading and opponents
another.18 7 In such a case of ambiguity between two competing
understandings of an ambiguous provision, it is perhaps appropriate
for the Court to invoke a modified version of the canon that the views
of sponsors of legislation are more authoritative than opponents 18 :
the public understanding of the supporters is more authoritative
because it is more likely to represent the compromise at which the
lawmaking process aims while the opponents, obviously, reject the
185 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 296 (1936) ("It is safe to say
that if, when the Constitution was under consideration, it had been thought that any
such danger lurked behind its plain words, it would never have been ratified.").
186 James Wilson's speech at the Pennsylvania convention is sometimes taken to be
a rare example of a Federalist advancing the suability view of Article III, see, e.g., Gib-
bons, supra note 37, at 1902-03, but-whatever he may have thought about the ques-
tion-that's not what he says. Wilson only praises the Article for providing a neutral
forum for disputes between states and citizens of other states; he does not say which
such disputes can arise. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 491 ("Impartiality is the
leading feature in this Constitution; it pervades the whole. When a citizen has a con-
troversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand
on a just and equal footing."); cf Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1051 (arguing that Wil-
son's "words are probably best understood as referring only to the neutrality of the
federal forum, for he made no reference to the clause imposing liability on an unwill-
ing state"). Edmund Randolph seems to be the only advocate of ratification publicly
to contemplate Article III as authorizing compulsive suits by individuals against states.
See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, Constructing Anerican National Identity: Strategies of the Federal-
ists, in FEDERALISTS RECONSIDERED 19, 27 (Doron Ben-Atar & Barbara B. Oberg eds.,
1998) (stating that Randolph and Wilson "urged ratification while arguing for the
suability of the states").
187 See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
188 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 585 (1988) ("'We have often cautioned against the danger, when inter-
preting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal
to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach. The fears and doubts
of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is
the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.'"
(quoting NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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compromise. Such a rule of thumb at least promotes the underlying
purposes of Articles V and VII. However that may be, the analogy to
Manning's textualist method is clear: if the proponents of a provision
construe it to include an established background principle in order to
win ratification (or to do so more easily), that background principle
becomes part of the legislative compromise. 189
These considerations do not resolve the character of the sover-
eign immunity principle in Article III. Nelson has argued that state
sovereign immunity survived Article III as a common law doctrine that
Congress could alter (though he equivocates on the latter point). 190
This Article, in contrast, holds that state sovereign immunity became
part of the constitutional bargain and therefore qualifies Article III
jurisdiction. Whether consistent with previous understanding or not,
sovereign immunity at ratification was understood as an inherent attri-
bute of sovereignty and states were understood to be "sovereignties"
under the constitutional compromise. 191 Whether there were some
limits requires additional consideration. The amendment proposed
by Virginia and North Carolina, for example, seems to contemplate
compulsive suits against states in admiralty and under treaties. 192 The
important point, however, is that there is no reason to expect the
immunity to match an abstract theory of sovereignty or the Constitu-
tion since the Constitution was, above all, a compromise. 193 One
might therefore have expected the contours of state sovereign immu-
189 Cf Manning, supra note 41, at 2465-66 ("[M]odern textualists unflinchingly
rely on legal conventions that instruct courts, in recurrent circumstances, to supple-
ment the bare text with established qualifications designed to advance certain sub-
stantive policies. For example, in the absence of clear congressional direction to the
contrary, textualists read mens rea requirements into otherwise unqualified criminal
statutes because established judicial practice calls for interpreting such statutes in
light of common law mental state requirements.").
190 See Nelson, supra note 35, at 1565-67.
191 This may have been a relatively recent idea. See Graebe, supra note 107, at 257
("That Hamilton and the Virginia delegates presupposed the sovereign immunity of
the states prior to the Constitution is remarkable in light of the scant historical justifi-
cation for such a belief.").
192 See supra note 170. The contemplation of compulsive suits is apparent if one
assumes that "a State shall be a Party" means either plaintiff or defendant, which is
what the author of the amendment, George Mason, purported to believe in the con-
text of Article III. But cf. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 494 (1921) (applying state
sovereign immunity to admiralty proceedings).
193 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1733,
1739 (1995) (arguing that "people who accept the principle need not agree on what it
entails in particular cases" and vice versa).
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nity under the Constitution to be shaped by early practice194 and judi-
cial elaboration, except that Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment
intervened.
III. READING THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The leading textualist accounts of the Eleventh Amendment pro-
duce a strained and implausible understanding of state sovereign
immunity because they fail to appreciate the original understanding
of the compromise behind Article III. Both John Manning and Law-
rence Marshall miss those background presuppositions that were com-
monly held at the time of the amendment and replace them with
anachronistic assumptions. Manning reads the Eleventh Amendment
as carving out a limited exception from the legal baseline of the
Chisholm majority. But given the view of legal precedent at the time,
only the decision of Chisholm, not the Justices' opinions, represented
the law. The Eleventh Amendment was designed to prevent such a
decision from recurring, not to overturn its rationale. Lawrence Mar-
shall argues, along with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens v.
Virginia,195 that the Eleventh Amendment is inconsistent with a broad
principle of state sovereign immunity because it allows suits against
states by other states. This view, however, ignores the common under-
standing of sovereign immunity at the time, which shielded a state
against suits by individuals but not other sovereigns. Instead, Profes-
sor Marshall relies on an unconvincing historical explanation and
anachronistically attributes contemporary notions of state liability
under federal law to the Eleventh Amendment's Framers.
A. Manning
For Manning, the Eleventh Amendment changed everything.
"[I]n the Amendment's absence," he writes, "the Court might legiti-
mately have generated a rather elaborate doctrine of state sovereign
immunity based on general authority derived from Article III or the
constitutional structure as a whole"' 9 6 or "engaged in a gradual com-
194 See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 130, at 222 ("A
liberal and steady course of practice can alone reconcile the several provisions of the
Constitution literally at variance with each other .... ); THE FEDERALIST No. 37
(James Madison), supra note 16, at 229 ("All new laws, though penned with the great-
est technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are consid-
ered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and
ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.").
195 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
196 Manning, supra note 21, at 1723.
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mon law elaboration of the ways in which state sovereign immunity fits
or does not fit, in different contexts, with our structure of govern-
ment."'197 The Court has done that of course, but illegitimately in
Manning's view because the Eleventh Amendment got there first:
Chisholm, however, altered the legal environment. It caused Ameri-
can society to focus explicitly on the question that Article III had
left unanswered: What kind(s) of immunity should the states enjoy
from suit in federal courts? Accordingly, it is necessary to ask
whether one should read the Amendment's specific resolution of
that question to displace whatever general authority the Court pre-
viously may have had to address the same question in common law
fashion. 198
In answering that question, Manning applies the expressio unius
canon to conclude that the Eleventh Amendment's specific enumera-
tion of immunities precludes finding other immunities implied in
Article III's more general, broadly worded text. He emphasizes that
expressio unius is not a "mechanical or acontextual solution to any
interpretive problem." Rather, the canon "directs interpreters to ask
whether a reasonable person reading the words in context would have
understood the specification to be exclusive."' 99 Manning's reasona-
ble person, however, can't reach a conclusion based on the text,
though he narrows it down to two possibilities:
[B]ased on the text alone, one cannot confidently determine
whether the Amendment's several exclusions of jurisdiction from
Article III represent (1) a comprehensive but pointedly circum-
scribed judgment about the proper scope of state sovereign immu-
nity in general, or (2) a narrower judgment about the
(un)desirability of allowing federal court diversity actions against
states. In the absence of additional facts, either position reflects a
plausible way to read the text.
2 00
Ultimately, Manning's reasonable person is persuaded by two
pieces of contextual evidence. First, the legal baseline of Chisholm:
despite the narrow question presented, the majority opinions in
Chisholm spoke in broad terms, reasoning that the whole doctrine of
state sovereign immunity had not survived the adoption of Article
197 Id. at 1731.
198 Id. at 1732-33.
199 Id. at 1725. In a footnote, Manning quotes one commentator as saying that
the canon "'properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind
of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast with that
which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference.'" Id. at 1725
n.229 (quoting EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 337 (1940)).
200 Id. at 1743.
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111.201 A reasonable person, therefore, would expect the Eleventh
Amendment to provide an answer to the broad question of the status
of state sovereign immunity presented by the opinions rather than
confine itself to the narrow case of diversity jurisdiction presented by
Chisholm's facts. 202 Given that expectation, Manning reasons, "the
Eleventh Amendment might well have been perceived as a carefully
circumscribed answer to that broader question."20 3 Second, the reso-
lutions of state legislatures that prompted the Amendment's
adoption:
[M]uch of the direct impetus for the Amendment's proposal came
from a series of resolutions by state legislatures instructing their sen-
ators to "fix" the problem perceived to exist in Chisholm's after-
math .... The spate of broadly worded state resolutions-calling
for the removal of "any clause or article of the constitution" that
"[could] be construed" to authorize suits against states-perhaps
reinforced the comprehensive sense in which Chisholm framed the
immunity question. Certainly, this historical backdrop negates any
contention that the amendment process in fact focused solely upon
the narrower question of citizen-state diversity presented by
Chisholm's precise facts.
2 0 4
Manning's reasonable person, then, does not read the Eleventh
Amendment so much as the national mood. The Amendment would
have an entirely different meaning for him if Chisholm had not been
decided, or if its opinions had been written differently, or if the state
legislatures had said or done different things. The previous Part
argued that constitutional provisions could be understood in light of
established background principles. 20 5 But Manning's reasonable per-
son imports what amounts to legislative history into his analysis.
20 6
201 See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450-51 (opinion of Blair,
J.).
202 Manning, supra note 21, at 1743-44. ("Although Chisholm's facts presented the
discrete question whether one could bring a diversity action against a state, the major-
ity opinions reasoned that such suits were permissible because state sovereign immu-
nity had simply not survived the adoption of Article III.... With the issue so framed,
a reasonable person would likely have thought of the problem of diversity jurisdiction
against states as part and parcel of the larger question of state immunity against Arti-
cle III jurisdiction more generally.").
203 Id. at 1744.
204 Id. at 1746-47 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
state resolutions).
205 See supra Part II.B.
206 Compare Manning, supra note 41, at 2472 n.312 ("[T]he absurdity doctrine
stands in sharp contrast to the more specific and tailored conventions, such as read-
ing established defenses into criminal statutes or applying equitable tolling principles
to statutes of limitations. Although those background conventions (like all legal con-
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Manning uses the reasonable person to infer Congress' purpose in
drafting the Eleventh Amendment. His reasonable person knows
about Chisholm and assumes that Congress would have wanted to con-
front its broad principle on its own terms-according to his own con-
jecture, not some shared background assumption of the interpretive
community. The fact that Manning is using a hypothetical "reasona-
ble person" to read Congress' mind makes the approach no less
purposive.
What's more, channeling the process of imaginative reconstruc-
tion through an objective "reasonable person" makes the interpreta-
tion even less reliable than direct examination of legislative history.
Manning's reasonable person knows enough contextual information
to see what everyone is doing, but he lacks any information about why
they are doing it. Instead, he attributes purposes to them. As a conse-
quence, he misreads history as well as text.
First, he anachronistically reads a modern notion of textual pre-
cedent back into the Chisholm era. It is by no means clear that many
people even read the Chisholm opinions. Volume 2 of United States
Reports, which contains the opinions, was not published until 1798-
four years after the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.20 7 A
pamphlet containing the opinions was available, though the cost was
prohibitive for many.208 The opinions were not widely published in
newspapers; only those of Chief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing ever
did appear. 20 9 "[A] more effectual mode could not have been
adopted ... to prevent these important opinions from being read by
structs) leave judges with more or less discretion, they at least provide some sense of
the range of possibilities and the framework for choosing among them."), with Man-
ning, supra note 21, at 1745 n.314 ("Given Chisholm's broad reasoning, a reasonable
person reading the Amendment's text might well have understood it as a response to
the more inclusive question defined by the Court's majority opinions.").
207 John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court
1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 139 (1999).
208 See A Citizen of the United States, NAT'L GAZETTE (Phila.), Aug. 10, 1793, at
326, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 231, 232 ("A large
pamphlet, price 50 cents, was made of [the opinions], and claimed as a copyright... :
Whereas they ought to have been public property, that they might be published in a
six-penny pamphlet, and in all the news-papers, in order that the great body of citi-
zens might be informed . . ").
209 Id. at 232 n.1 (editorial note indicating that Chief Justice Jay's opinion
appeared in Philadelphia's Gazette of the United States in August 1793); see also Veritas,
COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Boston), July 17, 1793, at 1, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 118, at 390, 391 n.1 (noting that Justice Cushing's opinion
appeared in Boston's Columbian Centinel in July 1793).
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the great body of the people," complained one citizen in August
1793.210
It should not be surprising, however, that the public debate over
Chisholm proceeded without its text being widely available. During the
latter half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nine-
teenth, the American conception of precedent followed the English
model, in which "[t]he cases were merely evidence of the law, which
existed independently."211 The decision of the case, not the opinion of
the judge, served as precedent. The holding was deduced by reason-
ing from the facts and the outcome of the case rather than by analysis
of the text. Indeed, there need not be any opinion at all in such a
system; 212 and, even if there is, it does not constitute binding prece-
dent. "'[I] t is not the rule of law set forth by the court, or the rule
enunciated ... which necessarily constitutes the principle of the case.
There may be no rule of law set forth in the opinion, or the rule when
stated may be too wide or too narrow."' 21 3 In the early Supreme
Court-and in Chisholm specifically-opinions were delivered seriatim
and orally, sometimes without a prepared text or notes.21 4 The prac-
tice of delivering a single opinion on behalf of the Court began only
with Chief Justice Marshall's appointment in 1801.215 Congress did
not even authorize the Supreme Court to appoint an official reporter
until 1817.216 The English view of precedent persisted in the United
States through the mid-1800s.
217
Given this conception of legal precedent, it makes sense that the
Justices did not always devote the utmost care to the preparation of
their opinions.218 And it also makes sense that a public would express
210 A Citizen of the United States, supra note 208, at 232.
211 Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1187,
1225 (2007).
212 See, e.g., Raffles v. Wichelhaus (The Peerless Case), (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375,
376 (Exch. Div.) ("There must be judgement for the defendants[.]").
213 Tiersma, supra note 211, at 1216 (omission in original) (quoting Arthur L.
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE LJ. 161,165, 167 (1930)).
214 Id. at 1223. During Chisholm, Justice Iredell took notes on his colleagues' opin-
ions as they read them, implying he lacked access to any authoritative text. SeeJames
Iredell, Notes on the Justices' Opinions, in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
118, at 214, 214-17.
215 Kelsh, supra note 207, at 143.
216 Tiersma, supra note 211, at 1227.
217 Id. at 1232.
218 See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.)
("TheJudges agreeing unanimously in their opinion, I presumed that the sense of the
Court would have been delivered by the president; and therefore, I have not prepared
a formal argument on the occasion."); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415,
417-18 (1793) (opinion of Blair, J.) ("My sentiments have coincided, 'till this
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its opposition to Chisholm by focusing on the decision itself rather
than the text of the opinions. The opinions of the Justices were not
law; the Constitution alone was. Because his reasonable observer fails
to appreciate the status of judicial precedent at the time, Manning
also misreads the state resolutions. The Massachusetts resolution,
which inspired similar resolutions from six other states, read:
Whereas a decision has been had in the Supreme Judicial
Court of the United States, that a State may be sued in the said
Court by a citizen of another State; which decision appears to have
been grounded on the second section of the third article in the
Constitution of the United States:
Resolved, That a power claimed, or which may be claimed, of
compelling a State to be made defendant in any Court of the
United States, at the suit of an individual or individuals, is in the
opinion of this Legislature unnecessary and inexpedient, and in its
exercise dangerous to the peace, safety and independence of the
several States, and repugnant to the first principles of a Federal Gov-
ernment: Therefore
Resolved, That the Senators from this State in the Congress of
the United States be, and they hereby are instructed, and the Repre-
sentatives requested to adopt the most speedy and effectual mea-
sures in their power, to obtain such amendments in the
Constitution of the United States as will remove any clause or article
of the said Constitution which can be construed to imply orjustify a
decision that a State is compellable to answer in any suit by an indi-
vidual or individuals in any Court of the United States.
219
The Massachusetts General Court's resolution clearly expressed
opposition to Chisholm's broad rationale as "repugnant to the first
principles of a Federal Government." But the resolution did not ask
for a constitutional amendment that repudiated the whole philosophy
of the Chisholm majority. Rather, it asked for the removal of "any
clause or article" that could justify such a decision in the future.
Other states, indicating their belief that Chisholm proceeded from a
misreading of the Constitution, asked even more modestly to "remove
or explain" any such provision, or otherwise to "prevent the possibility
of a construction" that denies the states' immunity from suit, or to
moment, with the sentiments entertained by the majority of the Court; but a doubt
has just occurred, which I think it my duty to declare."); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S.
(2 DalI.) 402, 407 (1792) (opinion of Wilson,J.) ("I confess that I have not been able
to form an opinion which is perfectly satisfactory to my own mind, upon the points
that have been discussed.").
219 Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court (Sept. 27, 1793), reprinted in 5
THE DOCUMENTARY HisTORY, supra note 118, at 440, 440.
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alter those provisions on which the decision "is supposed" to be
founded.220 The Virginia House of Delegates explicitly declared its
understanding that the original Constitution as ratified did not
include such a power:
Resolved, That a state cannot, under the constitution of the
United States, be made a defendant at the suit of any individual or
individuals, and that the decision of the Supreme Foederal Court,
that a state may be placed in that situation, is incompatible with,
and dangerous to the sovereignty and independence of the individ-
ual states, as the same tends to a general consolidation of these con-
federated republics.
22 1
The North Carolina General Assembly invoked the constitutional
bargain it had struck at ratification:
Resolved that such a power however it might have been con-
templated by some was not generally conceived by the representa-
tives of this State in the Convention which adopted the Foederal
220 See Proceedings of a Joint Session of the New Hampshire General Court (Jan.
23, 1794), reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 618, 618 (call-
ing on the state's senators and representatives to procure "such amendments in the
Constitution of the United States, as to prevent the possibility of a construction which
mayjustify a decision that a State is compellable to the suit of an individual or individ-
uals in the Courts of the United States"); Resolution of North Carolina General
Assembly (Jan. 11, 1794), reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at
615, 615 (calling on the state's senators and representatives to "obtain such amend-
ments in the Constitution of the United States as will remove or explain any clause or
article of the said Constitution which can be construed to imply orjustify. . . a deci-
sion that a State is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in
any Court of the United States"); Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates
(Dec. 27, 1793), reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 611, 611
(calling on the state's senators and representatives to seek such amendments "as will
remove any part of the said constitution which can be construed to justify a decision
that a state is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in any
court of the United States"); Proceedings of the Virginia House of Delegates (Nov. 28,
1793), reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 338, 338-39 (call-
ing for "such amendments in the constitution of the United States, as will remove or
explain any clause or article of the said constitution, which can be construed to imply
orjustify a decision, that a state is compellable to answer in any suit, by an individual
or individuals, in any court of the United States"); Resolution of the Connecticut
General Assembly (Oct. 29, 1793), reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 118, at 609, 609 (requesting that its congressional delegation secure "an altera-
tion of the Clause or Article in the Constitution of the United States on which the
decision of the said Supreme Court, is supposed to be founded so that in future no
State can on any Construction be held liable to any such Suit, or to make answer in
any Court, on the Suit, of any Individual or Individuals whatsoever").
221 Proceedings of the Virginia House of Delegates, supra note 220, at 338 (foot-
note omitted).
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Constitution as a power to be vested in the Judiciary of the General
Government and that this General Assembly view the same as derog-
atory of the reserved rights and sovereignty of this State.
222
And the Georgia House of Representatives, upon the commence-
ment of Chisholm, invoked the Madison-Marshall reading of Article III:
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the state of Georgia in General Assembly met, that they do not con-
sider the 2d section of the 3d article of the federal constitution to
extend to the granting power to the supreme court of the United
States, or to any other court having jurisdiction under their author-
ity, or which they may at any period hereafter under the constitu-
tion, as it now stands, constitute; to compel states to answer to any
process the said courts or either of them may sue out the said consti-
tution agreeably to the construction thereof by this legislature only
giving a power to the said supreme court to hear and determine all causes
commenced by a state as plaintiff against a citizen as defendant, or in cases
where two states are parties or between the United States and an
individual state: The contrary construction thereof submitting the
territory of the states and the treasuries thereof to the distresses or
levies of a Foederal Marshal, which is totally repugnant to the small-
est idea of sovereignty.
2 23
The resolution instructed Georgia's representatives to "apply for
an explanatory amendment" that would restore this construction.
224
Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment as adopted did not purport to
change the Constitution, but only to provide a rule of construction for
further interpretation of Article 111.225
Manning assumes that the states did not get what they wanted
because he does not believe that the Eleventh Amendment can possi-
bly be read to include the sort of sovereign immunity that the states
evidently endorsed. But Manning fails to notice-strangely, for a tex-
tualist-the apparent mismatch in the text of each resolution between
the broad principles of sovereignty, federalism, and original meaning
that states invoke and the relatively modest remedy they seek: to
excise or clarify whatever clause could be construed to authorize suits
by individuals against states.
222 Resolution of North Carolina General Assembly, supra note 220, at 615.
223 Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, AUGUSTA CHRON., Dec. 14,
1792, reprinted in 5 THE DOcUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 161, 161-62
(emphasis added).
224 Id. at 162.
225 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." (emphasis added)).
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Since Manning takes Chisholm as the "legal baseline" against
which the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, and Chisholm rested on
a broad holding that the states were not sovereign under the Constitu-
tion, he believes that establishing the sort of sovereignty the states
desired would require an affirmative constitutional amendment
explicitly declaring that the states are sovereign and possess full immu-
nity from suit by individuals. "With the issue so framed [by
Chisholm]," he writes, "a reasonable person would likely have thought
of the problem of diversity jurisdiction against states as part and par-
cel of the larger question of state immunity against Article III jurisdic-
tion more generally."
226
Against this interpretation, however, stand the resolutions of the
actual ratifiers of the Amendment-the states-which plainly did not
take Chisholm as their legal baseline. 227 They ask for removals and
explanations of constitutional provisions, not additions. Their pro-
posed amendments thus imply what their resolutions say explicitly
(right there, on the face of the text): that the states already possess sover-
eign immunity under the Constitution and all they need to do is cor-
rect an erroneous construction. This view accords with the general
background understanding of the time that judicial opinions did not
in themselves alter the law. But Manning replaces that understanding
with his own assumptions about precedent and what he would do if
faced with an identical situation today. It should go without saying
that this represents unsound textualist methodology.
228
Manning insists that the state resolutions in fact confronted
Chisholm's broad reasoning rather than its narrow holding. Two of
the Chisholm opinions, he observes, "asserted that state sovereign
immunity was flatly incompatible with the premises of our republican
form of government" and the states must have aimed to resolve that
question. 229 What construction, then, could he possibly give to the
language of the resolutions-"remove any clause or article of the said
Constitution"?230 That Massachusetts wanted to repeal the Guarantee
Clause?
The states clearly had different background assumptions in mind.
Manning is right that "to evaluate the Amendment's limited enumera-
tion of exceptions, it is helpful to know the legal baseline against
226 Manning, supra note 21, at 1744.
227 The New York, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania legislatures drafted resolu-
tions expressing similar ideas, but were stalled by disagreements over wording and
procedural factors. SeeJACoBS, supra note 12, at 65.
228 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
229 Manning, supra note 21, at 1744.
230 Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, supra note 219, at 440.
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which the adopters acted."231 The adopters here-three-fourths of
the states-acted against a baseline understanding that they enjoyed
sovereignty, including immunity, under the Constitution. What they
wanted to do was exactly what they said: remove any clause that could
lead to a different construction. Manning insists that "American soci-
ety had had no previous occasion to confront the question squarely,
one way or the other,"232 but the textual basis of Chisholm, the provi-
sion that extends federal jurisdiction over controversies "between a
State and Citizens of another State" had long been a subject of debate
as to whether it qualified or was qualified by state sovereign immu-
nity.233 The only other clause that mentions states and individuals is
the provision for suits "between a State... and foreign... Citizens or
Subjects." This language had been read in Chisholm to expose states
to suits by individuals. 23 4 The states announced their intention to
remove any clause that could be construed to expose them to such
suits. It appears that's exactly what they did.235
The Eleventh Amendment did not address suits by an individual
against his own state because no clause in the Constitution addresses
suits by an individual against his own state. It is true that the Amend-
ment did not address suits between states or between a state and a
foreign state. But jurisdiction over suits between states was already
accepted-it existed under the Articles and was understood to be part
of the constitutional compromise. 23 6 Plus, the states themselves, in
their instructions to their representatives, announced that they were
concerned about suits by individuals only. It may be that suits
between states and foreign states, as well as federal question suits,
231 Manning, supra note 21, at 1743 (citing W. Va. U. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499
U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991)).
232 Id. at 1748.
233 See supra Part II.B.
234 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 451 (1793) (opinion of Blair, J.)
("After describing, generally, the judicial powers of the United States, the Constitution
goes on to speak of it distributively, and gives to the Supreme Court original jurisdic-
tion, among other instances, in the case where a State shall be a party; but is not a
State a party as well in the condition of a Defendant as in that of a Plaintiff?. And is
the whole force of that expression satisfied by confining its meaning to the case of a
Plaintiff-State? It seems to me, that if this Court should refuse to hold jurisdiction of a
case where a State is Defendant, it would renounce part of the authority conferred,
and, consequently, part of the duty imposed on it by the Constitution; because it
would be a refusal to take cognizance of a case where a State is a party.").
235 See Nelson, supra note 35, at 1603-04 ("It may have seemed natural for an
amendment responding to Chisholm to address the very grants of subject matter juris-
diction on which members of the Chisholm majority had relied.").
236 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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were thought to be covered by the sovereign immunity states retained
under the Constitution. The states did not exist in a federal union
with foreign states, after all, in the same way they do with each other
and each other's citizens. The general understanding of state sover-
eign immunity, as precluding all suits by individuals against states, did
not seem to make an exception for federal laws.23 7 There was also an
idea that federal laws would apply to individuals only.238 It may be,
however, that there was no agreement on the question of foreign
states. Alternatively, American society may simply not have consid-
ered the possibility of federal question jurisdiction. 23 9 In such cases,
would it really make sense for one to consider the question resolved
by the Eleventh Amendment?
Manning assumes that because a law seems "precise," it must have
resolved all the relevant background legal questions and the Court
should read its limited provisions as such. That is, the Amendment's
silence with respect to other "kind(s) of immunity" should be read as
an affirmative rejection of them.240 But here Manning's warning-to
wit, "shifting a statute's level of generality to conform to its [sup-
posed] background purpose dishonors an evident congressional
choice to legislate in broader or narrower terms"241-applies equally
to himself. If Congress did not actually resolve those broader ques-
tions, assuming that the Amendment did resolve them dishonors a
congressional choice to address only one limited question at a time
(or at all).
Manning's assumption that precise constitutional texts resolve all
related constitutional questions conflicts with the thrust of his argu-
ment about why such texts are precise in the first place: because there
was no agreement on the more sweeping, general, or speculative ques-
tions. If one accepts Manning's contention that the limited scope of
the Eleventh Amendment plausibly reflects a situation in which a
majority may have supported a more sweeping Amendment, but a
supenmajority could only agree on its limited terms, it makes little
237 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 533 (statement ofJames Madison) ("It is
not in the power of individuals to call any state into court."). But see supra note 100
and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 181.
239 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-70 (1996) ("[I]n light of the fact
that the federal courts did not have federal-question jurisdiction at the time the
Amendment was passed (and would not have it until 1875), it seems unlikely that
much thought was given to the prospect of federal-question jurisdiction over the
States.").
240 Manning, supra note 21, at 1732.
241 Id. at 1691.
20091 118 7
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
sense to read the Amendment as affecting anything beyond the
agreed-upon terms. Indeed, it is natural to allow the minority to limit
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment in accordance with the political
compromise reached in the ratification process. But reading the Elev-
enth Amendment not only to prohibit the suits it specifies but also to
authorize unspecified suits would be to allow the minority to define the
Amendment's scope and effectively eliminate state sovereign immu-
nity. Compromises may be sustainable precisely because they leave
broader or more difficult issues unresolved.2 42 To enlarge the stakes
of such a compromise-to make it, in effect, all-or-nothing-would
prevent compromises from forming in the first place.
Imagine the Eleventh Amendment is just the sort of compromise
Manning assumes it is. A majority of confederalists, who want com-
plete immunity for states, compromises with a ratification-blocking
minority of dual-sovereigntists, who oppose only federal question
immunity. If the Eleventh Amendment were taken to preclude fed-
eral question immunity, the confederalists would not vote for it and
no amendment would be possible even though both would find it
desirable. The confederalists would abandon legislative compromise
and focus on winning judicial nominations.
A precise constitutional text might result from a compromise in
which the relevant actors decide precisely to defer such larger open
questions for future resolution. A broadly worded text might result
from a compromise in which they defer more specific open questions
for future resolution. Either way, courts ought to facilitate and
honor-rather than prevent and distort-legislative compromise.
Giving a purposive reading to either type of text disrupts that
compromise.
B. Two Marshalls
Professor Lawrence Marshall embraces Chief Justice Marshall's
reading of the Eleventh Amendment in Cohens v. Virginia.2 43 Both of
them claim to derive its meaning from the text. "That its motive was
not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation sup-
posed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the
nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment," accord-
ing to Chief Justice Marshall. "It does not comprehend controversies
between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State.
The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases: and in these
242 See Sunstein, supra note 193, at 1735-38; see also supra notes 50-52 and accom-
panying text (discussing the use of compromises in lawmaking and judicial action).
243 See Marshall, supra note 21, at 1354.
1188 [VOL. 84:3
ARTICLE III AS A CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE
a State may still be sued."244 From this reasoning alone, Chief Justice
Marshall concludes, "We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some
other cause than the dignity of a State."
2 45
The problem with this reading is that it is transparently dishonest.
As Lawrence Marshall puts it, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that a
sovereign immunity "theory of the amendment ... was inconsistent
with the amendment's terms. '2 46 But Chief Justice Marshall judges
the Eleventh Amendment against a theory of sovereign immunity to
which no one at the time of the Eleventh Amendment subscribed.
Jurisdiction between states had existed even under the Articles, when
states indisputably held sovereign immunity.2 47 And the Article III
provision that continued this "state v. state" jurisdiction was uncon-
troversial at the ratification of the Constitution, even in conventions
where disputes arose over Article 111.248 During the proposal and rati-
fication of the Eleventh Amendment, the States-repeatedly and
vociferously-expressed their understanding of sovereign immunity as
shielding a state from suit by individuals.249 The ratifiers of the Elev-
enth Amendment-the States-would not have understood state sov-
ereign immunity to be violated by cases between sovereigns, especially
not between states.
Thus-just as Manning's rational actor reads the Eleventh
Amendment against anachronistic background assumptions-Chief
Justice Marshall reads it against antiquated ones. Chief Justice Mar-
shall attributes a purist and alien theory of sovereign immunity to the
American states and, finding the text underinclusive for those pur-
poses, concludes that the Eleventh Amendment must mean some-
thing else. This is not a textualist reading.250 It is purposive in an
underhanded way. Instead of understanding state sovereign immu-
nity as the ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment understood it, Chief
Justice Marshall gives it a fixed and abstract definition. He uses the
244 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821).
245 Id.
246 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1354.
247 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 2 (U.S. 1781).
248 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 532 (statement of James
Madison) ("The next case, where two or more states are the parties, is not objected to.
Provision is made for this by the existing Articles of Confederation, and there can be
no impropriety in referring such disputes to this tribunal.").
249 See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text; see also Letter from James
Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 130, at 221 ("Nor is it less to be wondered at
that it should have appeared to the court that the dignity of a State was not more
compromitted by being made a party against a private person than against a co-ordi-
nate party.").
250 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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mismatch between his theoretical notion of state sovereignty and the
actually prevalent one at the time in order to strip the Amendment of
its most natural reading.
The state sovereignty view would be the most natural reading of
the Eleventh Amendment because the Article III clauses it modifies
were understood-ever since the proposal of the Constitution-as a
threat to state sovereign immunity; because Chisholm, to which the
Amendment was a response, was a denial of state sovereign immunity;
and because the state legislatures that proposed and ratified the Elev-
enth Amendment explicitly spoke of it as a protection of state sover-
eign immunity. Neither Chief Justice Marshall nor anyone else need
give the Eleventh Amendment a strong and purposive reading on
account of this evidence-it is possible that the Article V process com-
promised the states' original intentions-but to say that it has no rela-
tionship to state sovereignty strains credulity.
Chief Justice Marshall, who argued that state sovereign immunity
would survive the Constitution at the Virginia ratifying convention,
was-whether he believed them or not-at least familiar with the
common assumptions about state sovereign immunity prevailing at
the time. He might also have recognized the capacity of states to com-
promise-to recognize state sovereign immunity to some extent but
not completely.
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Marshall replaced the state sover-
eignty explanation by arguing that states actually ratified the Eleventh
Amendment to avoid payment of debts. He provided an historical
account of a financial crisis-one that may not have actually hap-
pened. Professor Marshall argues,"This account of the amendment's
fiscal origins has been accepted by virtually all who have researched
the background of the amendment. -2 5 1 Yet, as Clyde Jacobs writes,
"[T]here is practically no evidence that Congress proposed and the
legislatures ratified the Eleventh Amendment to permit the states to
escape payment of existing obligations. '252 By 1794, over two-thirds of
the states' debts had been assumed by the federal government, and
"the state governments, for the most part, were able and willing to
meet their remaining obligations."25 3 In 1790, Secretary of the Trea-
sury Alexander Hamilton estimated the total state debt at $25 million
and, of that amount, he proposed that the federal government assume
251 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1355.
252 JACOBS, supra note 12, at 70. See generally id. at 69-72 (evaluating the state-
debts explanation of the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment).
253 Id. at 69.
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$21 million.254 According toJacobs, total state indebtedness was prob-
ably about $26 million, and the amount actually subscribed was less
than that authorized: about $18 million.255 "[B]ut, at most, remain-
ing state debts amounted to approximately $8 million. Moreover, dur-
ing the 1790s and the ensuing decade, practically all of this
indebtedness was discharged, partly out of state revenues and partly
from federal credits, as wartime accounts between the states and the
central government were settled."256 Even if that were not the case,
the Federalists who controlled Congress in 1794 believed in the satis-
faction of public debts and would not have supported a constitutional
amendment to enable states to repudiate their obligations. 257
Professor Marshall, like the Chief Justice, refuses to take sover-
eign immunity advocates at their word. He quotes extensively from
George Mason's speech before the Virginia ratifying convention about
land disputes, 258 and he cites a portion of Mason's proposed amend-
ment to the Constitution limiting the judicial power of the United
States. 259 The implication is that Mason advanced a pragmatic argu-
ment about states' amenability to suit in light of financial concerns.
Professor Marshall leaves out, however, the full text of Mason's pro-
posed amendment, which would have eliminated federal diversity
jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction entirely.260 Professor
Marshall quotes only that part of Mason's proposal that would exclude
preratification causes of action. He does not quote Mason's explana-
tion of the source of Virginia's proposed immunity from suit: its sover-
eignty. "Is the sovereignty of the state to be arraigned like a culprit, or
private offender?" thundered Mason at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion. "Will the states undergo this mortification?" 261 The principle of
state sovereignty seems rather central to Mason's argument.
Of the supposed financial worries that prompted the Eleventh
Amendment, Professor Marshall writes,
The decision in Chisholm confirmed the worst fears of Virginia
and other similarly situated states. The preface to the relevant vol-
ume of The Calendar of Virginia State Papers declares that "[n] o event
probably in the history of the State ever so shocked the public sensi-
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. (footnote omitted).
257 See id. at 70.
258 See Marshall, supra note 21, at 1363-64.
259 Id. at 1364 n.99.
260 See supra note 170.
261 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 527 (statement of George Mason).
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bility" as the Supreme Court's assertion of jurisdiction in
Hollingsworth.
262
But why were they so surprised? According to Professor Marshall, "all
indications in the body of the Constitution are against state immunity
from federal jurisdiction." 263 Moreover, upon ratifying the Constitu-
tion, Professor Marshall maintains, everyone had acknowledged a con-
stitutional principle of "preserving as much accountability as
politically possible"264 and state sovereign immunity would be incon-
sistent with such a principle:
Just five years before the eleventh amendment was passed, the Con-
stitution had been ratified, complete with multiple restrictions on
state power. Supporters of the Constitution had stressed the impor-
tance of federal jurisdiction to ensure state compliance with these
provisions. Hamilton, for example, argued that "[n] o man of sense
will believe that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded
without some effectual power in the government to restrain or cor-
rect the infractions of them." The method the framers chose to
accomplish this, Hamilton continued, was to vest "authority in the
federal courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contraven-
tion" of the Constitution.
265
One might note that vesting "'authority in the federal courts to
overrule such as might be in manifest contravention"' of the Constitu-
tion does not necessarily entail suits against states. 266 But, in any case,
if it were true that the original public meaning of the Constitution
involved the understanding that states were to be subject to suit in
federal court so as to remain "accountable," then it is difficult to see
why the courts' entertaining suits against states would be so shock-
ing-or why claims against states would be regarded as so outrageous.
Professor Marshall lacks a full account of the public understanding
because he ignores the background understandings that shaped the
debate. He takes Article III literally rather than as it came to be
understood during the ratification process.
Instead, Professor Marshall anachronistically attributes more con-
temporary impulses to the actors of the period:
[I] t is helpful to consider the potential adverse public reaction that
might have greeted an amendment that constitutionalized state
262 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1364 (alteration in original).
263 Id. at 1346.
264 Id. at 1367.
265 Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALJST No.
80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 16, at 475-76; id. at 476).
266 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 16, at
476); see also supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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immunity from all suits, even those brought by a state's own citizens.
As elected officials, the congressmen and senators who voted for the
bill proposing the eleventh amendment were probably conscious of
their constituents' anticipated response to the amendment. In any
event, they certainly wanted to create an amendment that would be
ratified by the states.
267
But, in fact, at least seven state legislatures publicly endorsed just such
an amendment constitutionalizing state immunity from all suits
brought by individuals. 268 And state governors actively lobbied the
other states and Congress to support an amendment preventing, as
Samuel Adams put it in a message to other governors, " [t] he claim of
a Judiciary authority over a State possessed of sovereignty." 269 The
Georgia House openly declared its refusal to be made susceptible to
suit. "[T] his legislature are of the opinion," it resolved, "that the state
of Georgia will not be bound by any decree or judgment of the said
supreme court subjecting the said state to any process, judgment or
execution it may issue, award, pronounce or decree against the
same." 270 States expressed such defiance because federal suits against
states "would effectually destroy the retained sovereignty of the
states" 271 or, as the Massachusetts legislature put it, "a Government
being liable to be sued by an individual Citizen... is inconsistent with
that sovereignty which is essential to all Governments, and by which
alone any Government can be enabled, either to preserve itself, or to
protect its own members."
272
The States declared their objective of sovereign immunity-from
all suits by individuals-not only publicly, but in the name of the public.
Professor Marshall's suggestion that Americans in 1794 were not jeal-
ous of their states' sovereignty, but would have been outraged by limi-
tations on (then-nonexistent) federal question jurisdiction, ignores
reality. 27
3
Ultimately, Professor Marshall's point is that one should stick to
"the precise and determinate words" of a provision whenever a plausi-
267 Marshall, supra note 21, at 1369-70.
268 See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
269 Letter from Samuel Adams to the Governors of the States (Oct. 9, 1793), in 5
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 442, 442 (emphasis omitted).
270 Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, supra note 223, at 162.
271 Id. at 161.
272 Report of a Joint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court, INDEP. CHRON. (Bos-
ton),June 27, 1793, at 2, in5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 118, at 230, 230
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
273 But see Marshall, supra note 21, at 1368-69 (addressing the charge "that pre-
serving federal jurisdiction to promote state accountability is anachronistic").
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ble explanation for its being so drafted can be devised. 274 That's good
advice, but Professor Marshall, like the Chief Justice, divests those pre-
cise words of the general understanding they held at the time. Espe-
cially when it comes to constitutional texts, which often involve
compromises over abstract matters of principle, one ought to read the
text in light of common background understandings. Professor Mar-
shall reads the text literally.275 It remains unclear why one should
embrace a literalist reading of the text simply because one can imag-
ine a plausible scenario in which it would be drafted that way-espe-
cially, as here, where it seems to be a rather implausible plausibility. If
one struggles to construct a plausible sequence of events to explain a
text, one might also ask whether one is missing some background
assumption or rule against which it was originally understood. Often,
as here, that will involve an understanding of a broadly worded provi-
sion that it modifies. Understanding the compromise behind Article
III provides the simplest and most coherent explanation for the Elev-
enth Amendment, since the two clauses it modifies are the ones that
had always been at issue.
CONCLUSION
Sovereign immunity may or may not be a desirable doctrine, but
it is a constitutional one.276 Appreciating it as a product of compro-
mise leads one to recognize that sovereign immunity-or any constitu-
tional doctrine, for that matter-"is not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky."2 7 7 It has no necessary form or theory, but depends on the
bargain struck at ratification. The terms of constitutional compro-
mise may be embodied in broadly worded provisions as well as precise
ones. Either way, courts ought to read the text in a way that respects
the underlying bargain. By design, the Constitution empowers politi-
cal minorities to force compromise, and it subverts those process val-
ues to alter those compromises in the interest of theoretical
coherence or by privileging literalism over original understanding.
274 Id. at 1345.
275 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
276 Cf David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers,
1984 Sup. CT. REV. 149, 168 ("Sovereign immunity is an unattractive doctrine that
does not belong in an enlightened constitution. Unfortunately, however, it is a part
of ours.").
277 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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